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ARTICLES
ANTITRUST REMEDY WARS EPISODE I:
ILLINOIS BRICK FROM INSIDE THE
SUPREME COURT
ANDREW I. GAVILt
INTRODUCTION
Few questions in antitrust law have proven to be as
challenging as whether "indirect purchasers" should be
authorized to seek damages for antitrust violations. Despite the
seemingly unqualified language of Section 4 of the Clayton Act,1
which creates a treble damage private right of action for "any
person" injured in her business or property by virtue of an
antitrust violation, indirect purchasers have been barred from
t Professor of Law, Howard University School of Law. An earlier version of this
Article was presented as the 2005 Lewis Bernstein Memorial Lecture at St. John's
University School of Law on November 17, 2004. I would like to express my
appreciation to Professor Edward Cavanagh for the invitation to present the lecture
as part of the Bernstein series. I first presented some of the material contained in
this Article, along with other case studies of the Supreme Court papers of Justices
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. and Thurgood Marshall, with Professor William E. Kovacic at
the Annual Luncheon of the Spring Meeting of the Antitrust Section of the American
Bar Association in Washington, D.C. on April 2, 2003. I would especially like to
thank Professor Kovacic for our many discussions of the significance of the papers to
a better understanding of the process of antitrust decision making in the Supreme
Court. Appreciation also is in order for Ms. Eileen Santos of the Howard University
School of Law Library and Mr. John Jacobs, the archivist of the Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Papers at the Washington & Lee University School of Law Library, whose collective
assistance has been invaluable, and the staff of the Manuscript Division at the
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Finally, I am indebted to my research
assistant, Ms. Josephine N. Harriott.
I Section 4 provides that "any person who shall be injured in his business or
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefore in
any district court of the United States ... without respect to the amount in
controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost
of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 15 U.S.C. §15(a) (2000).
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seeking damages in federal court since the Supreme Court's 1977
decision in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois.2 At the same time, many
such indirect purchasers, often consumers, have been authorized
to seek the very relief barred in federal court under analogous
but more expansive state antitrust laws. The Supreme Court
specifically endorsed this dual-remedial scheme when, in
California v. ARC America Corp.,3 it rejected arguments that
Illinois Brick effectively preempted broader state antitrust
remedies. 4
Illinois Brick was animated by the Court's belief that
permitting indirect purchasers to sue would be inconsistent with
its earlier decision in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe
Machinery Corp.,5 would diminish the incentives for private
parties to file suit in federal court, would subject defendants to
multiple damages, and would mire the court in complex battles
over the apportionment of damages among various classes of
plaintiffs at different levels of the product distribution chain. In
short, the Court believed it would make for bad antitrust
remedial policy.
In its larger context, Illinois Brick also reflected a developing
and significant shift in the antitrust priorities of the Court; one
that found profound expression in the Court's 1976-77 term.
Whereas contemporaneous decisions like Continental T.V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania Inc.6 sought to rein in the substantive prohibitions
of the antitrust laws, which had come to depend in large part on
the invocation of per se rules of illegality, Illinois Brick and
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.7 focused on
2 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
3 490 U.S. 93 (1989).
4 See id. at 101-06. For a more comprehensive discussion of the development of
the federal-state remedial split, see generally Andrew I. Gavil, Federal Judicial
Power and the Challenges of Multijurisdictional Direct and Indirect Purchaser
Antitrust Litigation, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 860 (2001).
5 392 U.S. 481 (1968). In Hanover Shoe, the Supreme Court barred a firm found
to have violated the anti-monopolization provisions of Section 2 of the Sherman Act
from asserting a "passing on defense," i.e., from arguing that the plaintiffs, direct
purchasers of shoe machinery, had passed on all overcharges they may have paid to
their own customers. Id. at 489. For a more complete discussion of Hanover Shoe
and its impact on the Court's deliberations in Illinois Brick, see infra Part II.B.
6 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977) (holding that a location restriction imposed by a
supplier on its authorized dealers should be judged under the rule of reason
standard, not a per se rule).
7 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977) (establishing requirement that private plaintiffs
demonstrate "antitrust injury").
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restricting access to the Clayton Act's private treble damage
right of action. Collectively, this trilogy of cases trumpeted a
more sweeping message from the Court that today seems clear:
antitrust laws had been interpreted too harshly and the private
treble damage action had perhaps been used too expansively.
Ironically however, Illinois Brick and ARC America together
created a more vexing set of problems than those Illinois Brick
sought to avert.
In this Article, I will examine the available papers of the
Supreme Court justices from this critical period in the evolution
of modern antitrust law and policy.8 To set the stage, Part I
contrasts the state of antitrust in 1975 with that of 1990,
emphasizing the fundamental shift that commenced at the Court
in the late 1970s; a shift that was not at all limited to the new
members of the Court-the four Nixon appointees, Chief Justice
Warren Burger, Associate Justices Blackmun, Powell and
Rehnquist, and Justice Stevens, appointed by President Ford.
Indeed, Justice White, who had been on the Court since being
appointed by President Kennedy in 1962, proved to be a key
player with respect to indirect purchaser issues, authoring the
majority opinions in Hanover Shoe, Illinois Brick, and ARC
America.9 Justice Marshall, a Johnson appointee, authored the
majority opinion in Brunswick.10
After a brief overview of what I call the "Illinois Brick
quartet" in Part 11,11 Part III will consider the available papers of
the Justices who sat on the Court at the time of Illinois Brick:
Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and Powell. These
papers illuminate all phases of consideration of the case, from the
treatment of the petition for a writ of certiorari, to the evaluation
of the merits of the case by the clerks and the Justices, and the
8 For a discussion on the Supreme Court papers of Justices Powell and
Marshall, see ANDREW I. GAVIL ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES,
CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 266-67, 372-73 (2002); Andrew I.
Gavil, A First Look at the Powell Papers: Sylvania and the Process of Change in the
Supreme Court, 17-Fall ANTITRUST 8 (2002) [hereinafter "Sylvania and the Powell
Papers"]; William E. Kovacic, Antitrust Decision Making and the Supreme Court:
Perspectives from the Thurgood Marshall Papers, 42 ANTITRUST BULL. 93 (1997).
9 California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 94 (1989); Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois,
431 U.S. 720, 723 (1977); Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 483.
10 Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 478.
11 The "quartet" is comprised of Hanover Shoe, Illinois Brick, ARC America, and
Kansas v. Utilicorp United, Inc., 497 U.S. 199 (1990). For a discussion on the
quartet, see infra Part II.
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evolution of the Court's majority and dissenting opinions.
Perhaps the most striking discovery is that the initial conference
vote in Illinois Brick was to affirm, upholding the right of
indirect purchasers to sue. 12 Within a week's time however, five
Justices changed their votes. 13  Seemingly influenced by the
leadership and arguments of Justice White and others, the
Court's initial 6-3 vote to affirm was transformed into a 6-3 vote
to reverse, and a new majority coalesced.14
Although the papers of the various Justices vary greatly in
detail, they do suggest that in Illinois Brick several factors were
of particular importance in reaching the Court's result. Clearly,
a major change in the make-up of the Court and a change of
judicial attitude toward antitrust and business was a significant
factor. The import of that change was obscured to some degree
owing to the common leadership of Justice White in drafting the
majority decisions in both Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick.
Nevertheless, philosophically, the two cases are difficult to
reconcile and it seems highly unlikely that the full Hanover Shoe
Court would have decided Illinois Brick the same way.
Leadership within and without the Court also influenced the
outcome in Illinois Brick, with Justice White and a noted
commentator playing important roles in shaping the arguments
that ultimately prevailed. Other factors were also in evidence,
such as the role of the clerks, of the Solicitor General, who
appeared as an amicus, and of the broader readiness of the Court
to strike out in a new direction in antitrust.
Part IV concludes with some observations about what the
Justices' papers on Illinois Brick reveal about the process of
12 See Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court,
Merits Conference Notes, Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois (No. 76-404) (March 25, 1977), at
1-3 [hereinafter Powell Merits Conference Notes] (unpublished document, on file
with the Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Archives, Washington & Lee University School of Law
Library, Series 10.6, Box 43:188) (indicating the date of the conference on the top
right-hand side of the first page of his notes with the reference "Conf. 3/25/77"). For
an online index of Justice Powell's Papers, see Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Archives,
http://law.wlu.edu/library/powell/PowellPapers.html (last updated Feb. 12, 2003).
13 See Powell Merits Conference Notes, supra note 12.
14 See Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Associate Justice, United States
Supreme Court to the Conference of Supreme Court Justices, Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois
(No. 76-404) (Mar. 31, 1977) [hereinafter Justice Powell Memo to the Conference]
(unpublished document on file in Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Archives, Washington & Lee
University School of Law Library, Series 10.6, Box 43:188) (expressing his
willingness to change his vote from affirm to reverse based on the position outlined
at the first conference by Justice White, and soliciting other Justices to do the same).
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change at the Supreme Court relative to other decisions of the
time, particularly Sylvania.15  It also looks at judicial
developments subsequent to Illinois Brick, which suggest that
the Court's continuing support for the reasoning of the case
eroded over time. Finally, I pose a question that bears upon our
understanding of Illinois Brick, but more broadly on the
institutional role that the Supreme Court plays in establishing
national competition policy: what are the sources of the Court's
economic ideas, and what institutional filters exist to ensure that
the Court embraces sound economic reasoning when it
formulates that policy?
I. ANTITRUST IN A TIME OF CHANGE
A. Bench-Marking Antitrust: From 1975 to 1990
The antitrust counselor of 1975 faced a discouraging task in
advising clients of the antitrust risks of various kinds of
competitively sensitive conduct. Rigid per se rules abounded for
horizontal price-fixing, 16 vertical price fixing,1 7 tying,18 group
boycotts,19 and vertical non-price restraints. 20 Joint ventures
were also subject to significant risk,21 and standards for
horizontal mergers were highly restrictive. 22 In addition, single
15 For a discussion on Sylvania and the Justice Powell Papers, see generally
Sylvania and the Powell Papers, supra note 8.
16 See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vaccum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940)
(finding horizontal price fixing is per se unlawful); United States v. Trenton
Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397-400 (1927) (same).
17 See, e.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152-54 (1968) (concluding that
maximum vertical price fixing is per se unlawful), overruled by State Oil Co. v.
Kahn, 522 U.S. 3 (1997); Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S.
373, 399-400, 406-09 (1911) (deciding that minimum resale price maintenance is
per se unlawful).
18 See, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (finding tying
per se unlawful).
19 See, e.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212-14
(1959) (ruling group boycotts per se unlawful).
20 United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 382 (1967) (striking
down vertical non-price territorial restraints on dealers as per se unlawful),
overruled by Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
21 See, e.g., United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610-12 (1972)
(stating that division of markets by a group of independent retailers who formed a
cooperative association was per se unlawful).
22 See, e.g., United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 551-52 (1966)
(announcing that merger producing market share of 4.49% nationally was unlawful);
United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 272, 277-78 (1966) (holding
20051
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
firm conduct was subject to restrictive standards, especially for
predatory pricing. 23
To address concerns that the palette of cases developed by
the Court was too restrictive and hence over-deterring legitimate
competitive conduct, two avenues were open to the Court: (1)
adjusting the substantive prohibitions that had developed
through decades of case law; and (2) constraining the private
right of action. The 1976-77 term of the Court embraced both
approaches and proved to be a significant turning point in the
evolution of antitrust law. During that term the Court decided
Sylvania, which overturned the per se rule against vertical,
intrabrand non-price restraints,24 and in Brunswick and Illinois
Brick the Court looked to standing concepts to limit the private
right of action. 25 Both Sylvania and Brunswick shared a common
theme: antitrust must be tethered to clear theories of
competitive harm. All three decisions also shared another broad
theme: the antitrust weapon must be wielded more cautiously.
Looking beyond the specific holdings of these three cases,
they also signaled the emergence of what we now recognize as
modern antitrust economics. "Modern antitrust economics" is not
merely a set of rules about conduct, but a methodology for
deriving those rules that considers such factors as the
consequences of false positives and negatives and the competence
of courts and juries to reach judgments in complex matters of
economic regulation.26  It also has a debatable political
component, one that yields varying presumptions about the
intentions and inclinations of firms, especially dominant ones,
and the efficacy of government regulation of business.
merger producing firm with 7.5% market share unlawful); Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 343-46 (1962) (holding merger producing firm with about 5%
market share in a fragmented industry unlawful).
23 See, e.g., Utah Pie Co. v. Cont'l Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 692-98 (1967)
(declaring that sales by a single firm in one area at prices below those charged in
other areas was sufficient to warrant trial on allegations of predatory pricing).
24 See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58-59 (1977).
25 See Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 728-29, 746 (1977); Brunswick
Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489-90 (1977).
26 For a more comprehensive discussion of decision theory and its role in
deriving antitrust rules, see C. Frederick Beckner III & Steven C. Salop, Decision
Theory and Antitrust Rules, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 41 (1999); see also Andrew I. Gavil,
Exclusionary Distribution Strategies by Dominant Firms: Striking a Better Balance,
72 ANTITRUST L.J. 3, 65-68 (2004). For a Chicago School perspective on decision
theory, see generally Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV.
1(1984).
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The emergence of this new paradigm transformed antitrust
law. By 1990, the precedent available to that same counselor
presented a more nuanced and in many ways a more encouraging
set of possibilities for assessing risk. The possibilities for
defending mergers were reinvigorated by the Court,27 and by the
government's ground-breaking Merger Guidelines.28  Vertical
non-price restraints had been liberated from the per se rule,29
and although the per se rule against vertical minimum resale
price maintenance ("RPM") formally remained, the standards for
proving an RPM conspiracy were substantially elevated.30 In a
series of decisions, the Court imposed more stringent statutory
standing requirements on private antitrust plaintiffs, including
Illinois Brick's virtual ban on indirect purchaser suits. 31
The government's 1982 Merger Guidelines were especially
significant as a signal that antitrust analysis was moving out of
its "categorization" phase and into a more conceptual one, where
core economic concepts-market power, entry, and efficiency-
were more uniformly determinative of the outcome of antitrust
analysis. This was also reflected in the cases, which
progressively moved away from bright line rules based on case
categorization towards more economically grounded analysis.
27 See United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 497-98 (1974)
(merging firms successfully rebutted inference that merger would be anticompetitive
by demonstrating that market shares were not indicative of long term prospects for
exercising market power).
28 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES (rev. 1997), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines
hmg.htm.
29 See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 58-59 (vertical non-price restraints subject to
analysis under rule of reason, overruling Schwinn).
30 See Bus. Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 735-36
(1988) (to establish per se unlawful RPM conspiracy, terminated dealer must
present evidence of agreement to maintain prices at some specific level); Monsanto
Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 760-64 (1984) (complaints regarding low
prices followed by termination of discounting dealer not enough to permit dealer to
create jury question as to fact of per se unlawful RPM conspiracy by supplier). The
per se prohibition of maximum resale price maintenance would fall in 1997 with the
Court's decision in State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 21-22 (1997).
31 See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 540-46 (1983) (plaintiffs' alleged injuries were too remote
and speculative to warrant standing under antitrust laws); Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois,
431 U.S. 720, 746-47 (1977) (indirect purchasers barred from suit under Section 4 of
the Clayton Act); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489
(1977) (private treble damage plaintiffs must establish "antitrust injury;" injury of
the kind the antitrust laws were intended to prevent).
20051
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Although the per se rules against certain kinds of horizontal
agreements formally remained, 32 the Court demonstrated a clear
willingness to reconsider quick invocation of the per se label
where there was reason to believe the conduct had significant
justifications.33 The Court also introduced market power screens
to limit expansive use of the tying34  and group boycott
monikers, 35 and appeared to distinguish between collusive and
exclusionary group boycotts, preserving a clear per se rule only
for the former.36  The analysis of predatory pricing also
underwent a substantial increase in the plaintiffs burden of
proof,37 and no doubt was left in monopolization law that
exclusionary or predatory conduct was a necessary element of the
offense.38 In short, antitrust analysis moved away from a kind of
32 See Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 356-57 (1982)
(agreement as to maximum fee schedule by independent physicians was per se
unlawful price fixing); Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 650 (1980)
(agreement among rivals to restrict credit terms to customers was per se unlawful
price fixing).
33 See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468
U.S. 85, 100-01 (1984) (joint television rights agreement among rival college football
teams that restricted output of televised college football games was not per se
unlawful); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 20-24 (1979)
(use of blanket license by rival composers through ASCAP did not constitute per se
unlawful price fixing).
34 See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 18 (1984) (tying
per se unlawful, but only upon showing of market power in the tying product). In a
concurring opinion, four of the Justices expressed their view that the per se rule
against tying should be abandoned. See id. at 32, 35 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The
time has ... come to abandon the 'per se' label and refocus the inquiry on the
adverse economic effects, and the potential economic benefits, that the tie may
have.").
35 See Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S.
284, 297-98 (1985) (exclusionary group boycott only per se unlawful when the
excluding firms possess market power).
36 Compare Nw. Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. at 297-98 (exclusionary group
boycott only per se unlawful when cooperative possesses market power), with Fed.
Trade Comm'n v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 434-36 (1990)
(per se liability rule for collusive boycotting upheld). For a more comprehensive
discussion of the distinction between exclusionary and collusive boycotts, see
Kenneth L. Glazer, Concerted Refusals to Deal Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act,
70 ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (2002).
37 See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588-89
(1986) (to establish predatory pricing, plaintiff must demonstrate pricing below
competitive levels and probability of recoupment). See also Brooke Group Ltd. v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993) (same).
38 Compare Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 497-
98 (cases prior to Hanover Shoe displayed "no accepted interpretation of the
Sherman Act which conditioned a finding of monopolization under [Section] 2 upon a
[Vol. 79:553
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simplistic formalism, towards a far more economically driven,
and more complex, system of conceptually interrelated rules that
imposed substantially greater burdens of proof on antitrust
plaintiffs, public and private. 39
B. Changes in the Court
This sea change of direction at the Court was not the result
of any single factor but of the confluence of many political,
historical, and intellectual factors. 40 There can be no doubt,
however, that a critical factor was the change in the make-up of
the Supreme Court itself.
Of the nine justices sitting on the Court in 1967,4' only four
remained in 1977, when the Court took up Illinois Brick,
Sylvania, and Brunswick.42
showing of predatory practices by the monopolist"), with Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen
Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 610-11 (1985) (ski resort's deliberate efforts
to discourage customers from doing business with its smaller rival sufficient to show
predatory conduct).
39 For a comprehensive analysis of the relationship of these changes to the
evolution of federal government enforcement efforts, see William E. Kovacic, The
Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy Enforcement Norms, 71 ANTITRUST L.J.
377 (2003).
40 For a more extensive discussion, see generally Gavil, Sylvania and the Powell
Papers, supra note 8.
41 Chief Justice Earl Warren, and Associate Justices Black, Douglas, Harlan,
Brennan, Stewart, White, Fortas, and Marshall. Of these nine, five had been
appointed by Democratic presidents (Black and Douglas by Roosevelt, White by
Kennedy, and Fortas and Marshall by Johnson) and four by Republican presidents
(Warren, Harlan, Brennan, and Stewart, all by Eisenhower). The Federal Judicial
Center maintains a database of the basic profiles of all federal judges, including the
Justices of the Supreme Court. See Federal Judicial Center, Judges of the United
States Courts, http://www.fjc.gov/historylhome.nsf (last visited Sept. 15, 2005). The
Supreme Court also maintains a list of all of the Justices, with information on the
dates of their tenure on the Court. See Supreme Court of the United States,
Members of the Supreme Court, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/members.pdf
(last visited Sept. 15, 2005).
42 In 1977, the Court consisted of Chief Justice Warren Burger and Associate
Justices Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and
Stevens. Seven were Republican appointees (Brennan and Stewart by Eisenhower,
Burger, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist by Nixon, and Stevens by Ford) and two
were Democratic appointees (White by Kennedy and Marshall by Johnson). Chief
Justice Burger replaced Chief Justice Warren in 1969. Blackmun replaced Fortas in
1970. Powell replaced Black in 1972. Rehnquist replaced Harlan in 1972. Stevens
replaced Douglas in 1975. See Federal Judicial Center, supra note 41.
20051
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Although the four remaining Justices did not always find
themselves in dissent in antitrust cases, they often did,43 and the
newer Justices, although they did not always prevail, 44 were
almost invariably in the majority when the Court struck out in
new directions. 45
By today's political standards, however, it is hard to
43 See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 598
(1986) (White, J., dissenting) (Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens joined); Copperweld
Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 778 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(Brennan and Marshall joined); Cont'l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36,
71 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Marshall joined); Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431
U.S. 720, 748 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Marshall and Blackmun joined);
United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 511 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (Brennan, Marshall, and White joined).
44 See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982); Unites
States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
45 See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus., 475 U.S. at 574; Broad. Music, Inc. v.
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979); Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 36.
The Court in 1967 The Court in 1977**
Warren, C.J. (1953 - Eisenhower) Burger, C.J. (1969 - Nixon)
Black (1937 - Roosevelt) Brennan (1956 - Eisenhower)*
Douglas (1939 - Roosevelt) Stewart (1958 - Eisenhower)*
Harlan (1955 - Eisenhower) White (1962 - Kennedy)*
Brennan (1956 - Eisenhower)* Marshall (1967 - Johnson)*
Stewart (1958 - Eisenhower)* Blackmun (1970 - Nixon)
White (1962 - Kennedy)* Powell (1972 - Nixon)
Fortas (1965 - Johnson) Rehnquist (1972 - Nixon)
Marshall (1967 - Johnson)* Stevens (1975 - Ford)
** The four Justices who were members of both Courts are noted in bold
with an asterisk.
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characterize the views of the new majority block on the Court as
ideologically extreme. They did not openly embrace a specific
view of economics and advocate it consistently. They were more
traditional "conservatives" from another time. Grounded as
business counselors, they were largely skeptical of government
restraints on business and more trusting of the intentions of
private firms and of the power of markets. They were not trained
adherents of the Chicago School of Antitrust;46 but rather,
Chicago School and other economic criticisms of antitrust seem to
have resonated with them as intuitively correct, 47 and they
invoked Chicago School literature in support of their decisions,
although not exclusively. 48 An important consequence of the
confluence of their elevation to the Court with the presence of a
well developed body of critical economic commentary, therefore,
was their effort to better integrate antitrust law with economic
analysis. Relatively few of the significant ground breaking
decisions of the time remain controversial today-perhaps
evidence that antitrust was indeed in need of a mid-course
correction at the time, and surely a tribute to the practical brand
of economic analysis that it spawned. Illinois Brick, however, is
a notable exception.
II. THE ILLINOIS BRICK QUARTET
A. Visualizing the Indirect Purchaser and the Problem of "Pass-
On"
One of modern antitrust law's most urgent concerns is the
exercise of "market power,"49 defined by the Supreme Court as
the power to profitably raise or maintain price above some
competitive market benchmark. 50 The increment above that
46 For a classic exposition of the Chicago School's philosophy, see Richard A.
Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925 (1979). For
a discussion of the evolution of the Chicago School and of antitrust economics
generally, see William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A Century of
Economic and Legal Thinking, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 43 (2000).
47 See Gavil, Sylvania and the Powell Papers, supra note 8, at 12, 13 n.33.
48 See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus., 475 U.S at 589; Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 48.
49 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, supra note 28, at 2 ("The unifying theme of the Guidelines is that
mergers should not be permitted to create or enhance market power or to facilitate
its exercise.").
50 See, e.g., Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla.,
2005]
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competitive benchmark price is suggestive of market power, and
the actual price charged can be viewed as an "overcharge" when
compared to the competitive baseline. The overcharge associated
with the exercise of market power is perhaps the most concrete of
recognized "antitrust injuries," and is often the focal point of
damage calculations in private treble damage actions brought by
purchasers (direct and indirect) from the antitrust offender,
especially in cases of alleged price fixing or monopoly
maintenance.
Market power-or its extreme version, "monopoly power"-
can be exercised by a group of colluding rival firms, as with a
horizontal merger or cartel, or it can be the product of
exclusionary conduct by a single firm. In the latter case, the
exclusionary conduct facilitates the exercise of market power by
impairing or limiting competition from rival firms. Although as a
general matter the firm or firms exercising market power can
only collect one overcharge-from the first or "direct" purchaser.
All or part of that overcharge may be passed on by the direct
purchaser to subsequent purchasers, depending upon the direct
purchaser's ability to itself exercise some degree of market
power, and the ability of any subsequent purchaser to do the
same. Hence, portions of the overcharge could be paid by more
than one "customer" depending upon the product and how it is
sold.
For example, if the overcharge from the original seller, a
cartel participant, to the direct purchaser is $1.00, but the direct
purchaser is able to increase its price to the first indirect
purchaser by $.50, the direct purchaser has only suffered half of
the damage, and the first indirect purchaser the other half. Of
course, if the product is resold by the indirect purchaser, the next
buyer-also an indirect purchaser, albeit once more removed-
might also find itself paying part of the overcharge. It is easy to
see how this fact of distribution could pose a significant problem
of proof. Determining the amount of the initial overcharge may
itself be tricky business, because it requires some basis for
estimating the competitive benchmark. Trickier still may be the
problem of allocating the overcharge to different levels of
purchasers, direct and indirect to increasing degrees.
468 U.S. 85, 109 n.38 (1984) ('"Market power is the ability to raise prices above those
that would be charged in a competitive market.").
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It is important to realize that serious indirect purchaser
issues do not arise in simple bilateral purchase and sale
transactions, where a single seller deals with a single purchaser
who is the end-user of the product. Allocating overcharges only
becomes an issue when it becomes necessary to ascertain the
transmutation of the overcharge from the direct purchaser to
others. Ascertaining the amount of pass-on can arise in two
situations, although many variations can arise. First, allocation
problems could arise with a simple product that is distributed
through multiple levels before reaching a final consumer. There
the question will be how much of the overcharge is passed on at
each level of distribution to the subsequent indirect purchaser.
Second, allocating overcharges can also be necessary when a
product or service is typically sold as a component of a larger
product, either in a single transaction or in a multiple level one-
like the concrete blocks in Illinois Brick. In such cases, it may be
more difficult to ascertain the degree to which the overcharge
was in fact passed on as an element of the price for the larger
product into which the component was incorporated.
If the overcharge is the damage caused by the illegal exercise
of market power, the compensation question becomes "Who can
recover it?" in whole or part. From the point of view of
deterrence, who recovers it may be less important than simply
assuring that it is recovered by someone.
Allocation of the overcharge is not, strictly speaking, a
question of liability, but one of damages. Moreover, determining
whether it is possible to trace overcharges accurately is a distinct
question from whether, as a matter of antitrust policy, it will be
wise to do so. As we will see, in some circumstances, answering
the question "Should indirect purchasers be permitted to sue?"
can pit the deterrence function of treble damages against the
compensation function. One consequence of barring the recovery
of indirect damages, for example, is to concentrate the incentive
to sue in the hands of direct purchasers, which may increase the
incidence of suits, and, hence, deterrence. But it may also result
in windfall recoveries to direct purchasers who passed on the
overcharge, and no compensation whatsoever for the indirect
purchasers who were the true victims of the illegal overcharge.
Moreover, if the right to sue is limited to direct purchasers, and
the direct purchasers decide not to exercise that right, there will
be no compensation to anyone, and greatly diminished
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deterrence. 51 On the other hand, granting indirect purchasers
rights in the name of compensation could diminish the incentive
of direct purchasers to sue, which in turn might undermine the
deterrence goal of the private right of action.
Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick dealt with two permutations
of the overcharge allocation problem. In Hanover Shoe, the issue
was whether a defendant found guilty of monopolization under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act could defend itself against claims
by the direct purchaser of its product by arguing that the direct
purchaser "passed on" virtually all of the alleged overcharge to
its customers-that the direct purchaser suffered no injury. It is
often referred to therefore as a case involving "defensive pass-
on. '52 In Illinois Brick, the Court addressed the flip side of the
question, "offensive pass-on"-whether indirect purchasers
claiming pass-on by the direct purchasers can sue to recover the
portion of the overcharge they paid. 53
B. Hanover Shoe
Hanover Shoe was a follow-on to the United States' famed
prosecution of the United Shoe Machinery Corporation for
monopolization.5 4 The case hinged primarily on United Shoe's
51 In Illinois Brick, the Court stated that "Hanover Shoe does further the goal of
compensation to the extent that the direct purchaser absorbs at least some and often
most of the overcharge." 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977) (emphasis added). Even if that
were true of the prohibition of defensive pass-on in Hanover Shoe, it was not
necessarily true of offensive pass-on, which specifically enables compensation. By
precluding a defense of pass-on, Hanover Shoe eliminated the possibility that an
antitrust wrongdoer could in effect avoid liability on a compensation "technicality."
"Who sued?" was less important to the Court than what the offender had done. More
importantly, there was and remains no support for the Court's presumption that
"often most" of the overcharge will be borne by the direct purchaser. Pass-on may or
may not occur in any given case. Under Illinois Brick, single products simply sold
through minimal levels of distribution are lumped together and treated the same as
component products sold through many. See id. at 735. Such a "one size fits all" per
se rule is arguably ill-fitting to the broad range of possible circumstances.
52 See Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 487-88
(1968).
53 See Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 726.
54 See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass.
1953), aff'd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). For a thorough account of the district court
proceedings before Judge Charles Wyzanski, see CARL KAYSEN, UNITED STATES V.
UNITED SHOE MACHINERY CORPORATION: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF AN ANTI-
TRUST CASE (1956). Kaysen, a trained economist, served as Wyzanski's clerk during
his handling of the case. It is noteworthy that the original decree against United
Shoe Machinery was limited to conduct restrictions, but it reserved the right to
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distribution practices with respect to its shoe producing
machinery, especially its lease only policies. 55 Hanover Shoe was
a direct purchaser of that machinery.
The principal issue in Hanover Shoe concerned United Shoe's
assertion of a "pass-on" defense. 56 United Shoe argued that,
because Hanover Shoe had passed on any increased cost from
United Shoe-any "monopolistic overcharges"-to its own
customers, shoe distributors, Hanover Shoe had not been injured
by United Shoe's conduct. 57 In a majority opinion authored by
Justice Byron R. White, the Court rejected use of the pass-on
defense.58 It offered three policy reasons in support of that
conclusion: first, calculating pass-on would "normally prove
insurmountable;" 59  second, permitting the defense would
significantly eviscerate the incentive of direct purchasers to bring
suit for antitrust violations, which itself would substantially
undermine the deterrent value of the private right of action;
60
and third, permitting a pass-on defense would allow offenders to
retain the "fruits of their illegality," since few direct purchasers
would bring suit against them. 61 Moreover, it held that a direct
purchaser was entitled to a presumption of damages equal to the
overcharge. 62  The Court also noted that there might be
exceptions to both the assumption of difficult apportionment and
revisit the possibility of structural relief-particularly divestiture-if, after the
decree's ten year term, the government could demonstrate that conduct relief had
failed to produce a more competitive market. United Shoe, 110 F. Supp at 354. The
end of the ten year term of the decree roughly coincided with Hanover Shoe. Indeed,
approximately one month before the Court decided Hanover Shoe, it specifically
authorized the lower courts to proceed to consider divestiture against the defendant
in the government's case. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S.
244, 250-51 (1968).
55 See United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. at 297-98, 314-25, 340-44, 349-
50 (discussing the importance of United Shoe's lease-only policy to its power over the
market).
56 See Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 487-88.
57 See id.
58 See id. at 488.
59 See id. at 493. The Court went on to argue that "[t]reble-damage actions
would often require additional long and complicated proceedings involving massive
evidence and complicated theories." Id.
60 See id. at 494.
61 See id.
62 See id. ("Our conclusion is that Hanover proved injury and the amount of its
damages for the purposes of its treble-damage suit when it proved that United had
overcharged it during the damage period and showed the amount of the overcharge;
United was not entitled to assert a passing-on defense.") (emphasis added).
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the presumption that direct purchasers suffered damages equal
to the overcharge:
We recognize that there might be situations-for instance, when
an overcharged buyer has a pre-existing "cost-plus" contract,
thus making it easy to prove that he has not been damaged-
where the considerations requiring that the passing-on defense
not be permitted in this case would not be present. We also
recognize that where no differential can be proved between the
price unlawfully charged and some price that the seller was
required by law to charge, establishing damages might require
a showing of loss of profits to the buyer.63
C. Illinois Brick
The State of Illinois initiated Illinois Brick to recover for
what the State believed was its share of derivative overcharges
incurred in its capacity as a consumer of construction services
that included raw materials supplied by Illinois Brick and
others.64 The case was a follow-on action to civil and criminal
cases that the Department of Justice brought against Illinois
Brick and a group of its rivals, who were collectively charged
with the fixing the price of concrete blocks. The district court
granted partial summary judgment to the defendants and held
that the State lacked standing to pursue its claims.65 The Court
of Appeals reversed. 66 It did not concur with the district court's
standing analysis. More importantly, in the court's view no per
se rule barring all indirect purchasers from seeking to prove
pass-on offensively was warranted.67  Recovery should be
permitted, it concluded, provided pass-on could be proven. 68
In granting Illinois Brick's petition for a writ of certiorari,
the Supreme Court faced two significant issues of timing, both of
63 Id.
64 See Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 726-27 (1977).
65 According to the Supreme Court, the district court did not rely on Hanover
Shoe, but on its own view of standing, reasoning that Illinois "lacked standing to sue
for an overcharge on one product-concrete block-that was incorporated by the
masonry and general contractors into an entirely new and different product-a
building." Id. at 728 n.7.
66 See Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 536 F.2d 1163, 1167 (7th Cir. 1976)
(reversing the district court), rev'd sub nom. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720
(1977).
67 See id. at 1166-67 (concluding that a plaintiff, including an indirect
purchaser, should recover if he or she demonstrates injury under the Clayton Act).
68 See id. at 1165.
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which evoked important questions about the Court as an
institution. First, the Court had rejected the pass-on defense
nine years earlier, in Hanover Shoe.69 Hence, Illinois Brick
squarely presented the Court with a test of its commitment to
stare decisis: to what degree should the Court's judgments about
pass-on in Hanover Shoe dictate the outcome in Illinois Brick?
Second, the Seventh Circuit had delivered its opinion in Illinois
Brick on June 22, 1976.70 By that time, Congress was already
considering amendments to the federal antitrust laws that would
expand the rights of States, acting as parens patriae, to bring
suit under the federal antitrust laws on behalf of their citizens.
The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on September 17,
1976 71-shortly before the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act of 197672 became law on September 30, 1976.
The Act amended the Clayton Act, specifically authorizing the
States to sue on behalf of their citizens under the antitrust laws
as parens patriae.73 By their nature, parens patriae suits are
often brought on behalf of consumers, who are indirect
purchasers. There was some significant legislative history to
indicate that at least some members of Congress believed that
indirect purchasers generally had the right to sue despite
Hanover Shoe and that the legislation did not create any new
liabilities.74  The Court would have to grapple with the
significance of both Hanover Shoe and the new Act.
75
The Supreme Court reversed in a 6-3 decision authored by
69 Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 494 (1968).
70 See Ampress Brick, 536 F.2d at 1163.
71 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977)
(No. 76-404). See also Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Associate Justice, United States Supreme
Court, Certiorari Conference Notes, Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois (No. 76-404) (Nov. 5,
1976) [hereinafter Powell Certiorari Conference Notes] (unpublished document, on
file as part of the Powell Papers in Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Archives, Washington & Lee
University School of Law Library, Series 10.6, Box 43:188).
72 Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976).
73 The relevant provision was incorporated into the Clayton Act as Section 4(c),
and includes a proviso excluding from the amount recoverable "any amount of
monetary relief ... which duplicates amounts which have been awarded for the
same injury .... " 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a)(1) (2000).
74 See infra notes 215-27 and accompanying text.
75 As is discussed more fully below, the Court concluded that the legislative
history was inapposite, and that no special deference was owed "[tihe views
expressed by particular legislators as to the meaning of' Section 4. Ill. Brick Co. v.
Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 734 n.14 (1977).
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Justice Byron R. White. 6 As a preliminary matter, the Court
addressed "symmetry," the notion that defensive and offensive
pass-on must be treated alike. If the Court were to adhere to the
principle of symmetry, the Court would have to decide between
overruling Hanover Shoe or reversing the Court of Appeals. 77
The three dissenting Justices rejected the symmetry principle,
arguing that deterrence could best be served by retaining
Hanover Shoe's bar to defensive pass-on, but permitting indirect
purchasers to sue.7 8
The majority disagreed with this approach, and offered two
principal and several subsidiary reasons for doing so. First, it
argued that "allowing offensive but not defensive use of pass-on
would create a serious risk of multiple liability for defendants." 79
Second, it further argued that "the reasoning of Hanover Shoe"80
regarding the difficult evidentiary issues associated with
apportionment would be equally applicable to offensive pass-on
as they had been to defensive pass-on.8'
The Court also rejected the view that Hanover Shoe's
concern with deterrence would be best served by permitting
indirect purchasers to sue.8 2  Hanover Shoe rested "on the
judgment that the antitrust laws will be more effectively enforced
by concentrating the full recovery for the overcharge-in the direct
purchasers rather than by allowing every plaintiff potentially
affected by the overcharge to sue only for the amount it could
show was absorbed by it."83 It also paid homage to stare decisis,8 4
and further reasoned that "[p]ermitting the use of pass-on
theories.., essentially would transform treble-damages actions
into massive efforts to apportion the recovery among all potential
plaintiffs that could have absorbed part of the overcharge .... "85
76 See Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 723, 728, 748.
77 According to the Court, Illinois had conceded the point, but asked that
Hanover Shoe be confined to its facts: a case of "overcharges for capital goods used to
manufacture new products." Id. at 729.
78 See id. at 760 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan argued for an
exception whenever both direct and indirect purchasers were parties to the same
action. Id. at 753 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
79 See id. at 730.
80 See id. at 731.
81 See id. at 731-32.
82 See id. at 746.
83 Id. at 735.
84 See id. at 736-37.
85 Id. at 737. The Court appeared to dismiss the efficacy of existing procedural
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The Court also questioned the capacity of economics itself to
deliver, as promised, reliable theories to establish both the
overcharge and apportionment.8 6
In a final section of its opinion, the Court conceded that
Section 4 of the Clayton Act was designed to serve two
functions-deterrence and compensation-and that a rule
barring indirect purchasers would concentrate all compensation
in the hands of direct purchasers.8 7 The majority explained,
however, that a symmetrical application of Hanover Shoe would
indeed serve both goals.88 The Court pointed out that deterrence
would be served because 'it is irrelevant to whom damages are
paid, so long as some one redresses the violation."'8 9
Additionally, because the Court assumed that "the direct
purchaser absorbs at least some and often most of the
overcharge," 90 compensation would be served by concentrating
recovery in its hands. 9' Therefore, allocating damages to indirect
purchasers could dilute compensation, and diminish the
incentive of direct purchasers to sue which, in turn, would dilute
the deterrence value of the treble damage remedy.
The Court noted two exceptions to its virtual per se rule
against pass-on. First, as the Court had observed in Hanover
Shoe, there might be situations where the direct and indirect
purchaser had contractually agreed to pass-on by using a "cost-
plus" pricing formula. 92 A second exception might be in order
when the indirect purchaser owns or controls the direct
purchaser, in essence making it the direct purchaser.93
devices, such as joinder under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19, and statutory
interpleader under 28 U.S.C. § 1335. Id. at 737-41. It also viewed multi-district
proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 1407 as inadequate to protect against multiple
liability. Id. at 731 n.11.
86 Id. at 741-44.
87 See id. at 746.
88 See id. at 746-47.
89 Id. at 746 (quoting Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 760 (1977)
(Brennan, J., dissenting)).
90 Id. (emphasis added).
91 See id.
92 See id. at 732 n.12, 735-36; Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp.,
392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968).
93 See Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 736 n.16 ("Another situation in which market forces
have been superseded and the pass-on defense might be permitted is where the
direct purchaser is owned or controlled by its customer."); see also California v. ARC
Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 97 n.2 (1989) (noting Illinois Brick's two exceptions).
20051
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
D. From Illinois Brick to ARC America and Beyond
At the time Illinois Brick was briefed and argued, a number
of states already had authorized indirect purchasers to sue, but
the potential significance of that fact was simply not addressed
either in Hanover Shoe or in Illinois Brick.94 It would take more
than a decade and a rash of legislative responses at the state
level for the complete significance of state indirect purchaser
rights to become apparent to the Court.95
The growing tension between Illinois Brick and State
"Illinois Brick repealers" climaxed in 1989, when the Court
decided California v. ARC America Corp. ARC America involved
allegations of nationwide price fixing in the cement industry.
The States of Alabama, Arizona, California, and Minnesota
commenced suit in federal court under both federal and state
antitrust laws seeking to recover as indirect purchasers on their
own behalf and as representatives of classes of other
governmental entities in their respective States.96 The States'
actions were transferred and consolidated for pretrial
proceedings with the claims of many other plaintiffs, including
direct purchasers. When the claims were all settled, the question
became whether payments from the settlement fund should be
disbursed to the States in their capacities as indirect purchasers.
Under federal law, as established by Illinois Brick, the answer
was clearly "No." But the States asserted their indirect
94 This fact was noted by the Court in ARC America, stating that "[n]either case
contains any discussion of state law or of the relevant standards for pre-emption of
state law." 490 U.S. at 102.
95 In response to Illinois Brick, in 1981 the State of Illinois amended its own
statute to expressly authorize recovery by indirect purchasers:
No provision of this Act shall deny any person who is an indirect purchaser
the right to sue for damages. Provided, however, that in any case in which
claims are asserted against a defendant by both direct and indirect
purchasers, the court shall take all steps necessary to avoid duplicate
liability for the same injury including transfer and consolidation of all
actions. Provided further that no person other than the Attorney General of
this State shall be authorized to maintain a class action in any court of this
State for indirect purchasers asserting claims under this Act.
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 10/7(2) (1993). According to one survey, nineteen states,
Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia adopted Illinois Brick repealers of one kind
or another in the years immediately following the decision. See Kevin J. O'Connor, Is
the Illinois Brick Wall Crumbling?, 15-SUM. ANTITRUST 34, 34-35 & n.5 (2001).
Today, more than half the States recognize indirect purchaser rights in some
fashion. Id.
96 See ARC Am., 490 U.S. at 97.
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purchaser rights under contrary state laws.97
The issue before the Court, therefore, was preemption. The
States appealed the lower courts' decision that Illinois Brick-as
an interpretation of the purposes and objectives of Congress in
adopting Section 4 of the Clayton Act-preempted contrary state
laws, which purported to authorize indirect purchasers to sue
under state antitrust laws. 98 In a unanimous opinion 99 authored
by Justice Byron R. White-the author of the majority opinions
in Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick-the Court reversed.
In the Court's view, State "Illinois Brick repealers" did not
satisfy any of the three traditional bases for federal preemption:
(1) express, (2) implied by virtue of a Congressional decision to
occupy a field, or (3) implied due to actual conflict between state
and federal law. 100 Illinois Brick was an interpretation of Section
4 of the Clayton Act by the Court, and Congress had never
expressly preempted state indirect purchaser statutes.10 1
Neither, in the Court's view, did the repealers actually conflict
with Illinois Brick.102  Although the States had reached a
judgment about indirect purchaser rights that was at odds with
the Court's judgment in Illinois Brick, recognition of those rights
would not make compliance with both federal and state law
impossible or .'stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."0 3
Finally, the Court emphasized the "presumption against finding
pre-emption of state law in areas traditionally regulated by the
States," which included antitrust and related laws. 10 4
The consequence of Illinois Brick and ARC America was one
97 The preceding facts are summarized from the Court's opinion. See id. at 96-
99.
98 See id. at 99-100. The Court explained that "[t]he issue before us is whether
this rule limiting recoveries under the Sherman Act [the rule of Illinois Brick] also
prevents indirect purchasers from recovering damages flowing from violations of
state law, despite express state statutory provisions giving such purchasers a
damages cause of action." Id. at 100.
99 Justices Stevens and O'Connor took no part in the consideration of the case.
See id. at 94.
100 See id. at 100-01.
101 See id. at 101-03.
102 See id. at 103.
103 Id. at 101 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). For the
Court's complete analysis of this critical point, see id. at 103-06.
104 Id. at 101 ("Given the long history of state common-law and statutory
remedies against monopolies and unfair business practices, it is plain that this is an
area traditionally regulated by the States.") (footnote omitted).
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that could not have been fully appreciated by the Court in 1977:
multi-forum, multi-jurisdiction, complementary, but separate
litigation. 10 5  Today, direct purchasers file in federal courts;
indirect purchasers file in state courts. Defendants in federal
courts typically seek and often secure pre-trial transfer and
consolidation pursuant to federal provisions for multi-district
litigation. In contrast, defendants in state court indirect
purchaser actions have limited ability to remove the cases to
federal court, 10 6 and hence little power to seek transfer and
consolidation with related federal court direct purchaser
litigation. Neither can they seek state-to-state transfer.
Ironically, the situation is in many ways worse than the one the
Court sought to avoid in Illinois Brick itself. If indirect
purchaser suits had been permitted in federal court, then direct
and indirect purchaser cases could have been more readily
combined, and the problems of overcharge allocation minimized
through coordination. The threat of multiple and inconsistent
recoveries is far greater with the separation that now prevails. 0 7
105 As one commentator-the Assistant Attorney General who headed the
Antitrust Division and represented the federal government before the Supreme
Court in Illinois Brick-has put it: "That is the great irony of Illinois Brick-where a
conservative decision led to a populist political reaction that has produced
duplicative litigation and recoveries on a scale that the Supreme Court majority
could scarcely have imagined in the first place." Donald I. Baker, Federalism and
Futility: Hitting the Potholes on the Illinois Brick Road, 17-FALL ANTITRUST 14, 15
(2002).
106 That ability has probably been enhanced to some degree by the recently
passed Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 5, 119 Stat. 4, 12
(2005).
107 For a more comprehensive discussion of the litigation management issues
created by Illinois Brick and ARC America together, see Gavil, supra note 4, at 881-
901, and Andrew I. Gavil, Remarks Before the Antitrust Modernization Commission:
Panel II: State Indirect Purchaser Actions: Proposals for Reform (June 27, 2005),
available at http://www.amc.gov/commission-hearings/pdf/GavilStatement_
corrected_6.27.05_version with-app.pdf.
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III. ILLINOIS BRICK FROM INSIDE THE COURT
A. The Currently Available Supreme Court Papersos
More than a quarter century has passed since Illinois Brick,
and today the papers of four of the Justices then sitting on the
Court are publicly available. The papers of all of the dissenting
Justices-Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun-are available in
the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress. Of the
majority, only Justice Powell's papers are open, but they are
quite comprehensive and revealing. 10 9  Hence, the available
papers provide an arguably fair sampling of both sides of the
internal debate at the Court, and permit some significant study
and preliminary observations about the institutional process that
produced the decision.
Nevertheless, some caution is in order given the partial
sampling that is available. The majority opinion was authored
by Justice White, who was joined by Chief Justice Burger, as well
as Justices Rehnquist, Powell, Stewart, and Stevens. Of course,
Justice Stevens remains on the Court, so his papers are
unavailable, and the papers of Justices Stewart and Chief Justice
Burger remain restricted." 0 If there is a potentially critical
missing link in the story, it is likely the work of Justice Byron R.
White, who authored the majority opinions in all three critical
decisions-Hanover Shoe, Illinois Brick, and ARC America, as
well as a significant dissent in Kansas v. Utilicorp United, Inc."1
108 The Tarlton Law Library at the University of Texas School of Law has
assembled a very useful online tool for research into the papers of former justices of
the Supreme Court. It indexes all of the Justices for whom papers are available and
provides links to relevant online catalogues. See Supreme Court Justices Finding
Aids, http://tarlton.law.utexas.edu/vlibrary/spct/justices.html (last visited Sept. 15,
2005).
109 The papers of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. are available to the public at his
alma mater, Washington & Lee University School of Law.
110 Justice Stewart's papers are housed at Yale University and are currently
closed. See Historical Publications from the Federal Judicial Center,
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/tGetMan?jid=2294 (last visited Sept. 15, 2005). Chief
Justice Burger's papers are housed at his alma mater, the College of William &
Mary, and are closed until 2026. See Historical Publications from the Federal
Judicial Center, http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/tGetMan?jid=319 (last visited Sept. 15,
2005). Chief Justice Rehnquist died this past summer, and it is not yet clear what
arrangements he made for the disposition of his Supreme Court papers.
111 497 U.S. 199, 219-26 (1990) (White, J., dissenting). Justice White was joined
in his Utilicorp dissent by the three Illinois Brick dissenters, Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun. For a discussion of Utilicorp, see infra Part IV.B.
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Although an extensive catalogue of his papers is available online,
access to the papers themselves remains restricted until 2012, a
decade after his death in April 2002.112
B. Illinois Brick's Path to the Supreme Court
The available papers disclose a significant amount of detail
about the Court's deliberations in Illinois Brick. Four factors are
of particular interest: (1) the internal discussion of the case's
cert-worthiness; (2) the Court's consideration of Congress'
passage in 1976 of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act; (3) the shifting vote in the case, which
changed from affirm to reverse owing largely to Justice White's
emergence as a leader for the view that indirect purchasers
should largely be barred from federal court; and (4) the lessons of
what was in essence a raw, but perhaps not fully informed, policy
debate within the Court.
1. The Uncertainty of Certiorari
The clerk's initial certiorari pool memorandum appeared to
oppose granting the petition of the manufacturers. The clerk
wrote "[t]here is no square conflict at the circuit level," and the
"clear trend in the circuits supports" the Court of Appeals'
decision below to permit indirect purchasers to sue. 113 He further
reasoned that although "[t]here may at some point be a genuine
problem of double liability ... it is clear that petitioners have not
yet been subjected to double liability."'1 14  He concluded,
suggesting that "[r]eview of [the claim of double liability] might
112 See Byron R. White Papers, http://www.loc.gov/rr/mss/text/whitebr.html (last
visited Sept. 15, 2005). The Index reveals that files exist for Hanover Shoe (Box I:
124 - 4 folders), Illinois Brick (Box I: 383 - 2 folders), ARC America (Box II: 114),
and Utilicorp (Box II: 139).
113 Preliminary Memorandum to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Associate Justice,
United States Supreme Court, Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois (No. 76-404) (Oct. 26, 1976), at
3 [hereinafter Preliminary Memorandum to Justice Blackmun] (unpublished
document, on file as part of the Papers of Harry A. Blackmun in Library of Congress,
Manuscript Division, Box 252). For an online register of Justice Blackmun's papers,
see The Harry A. Blackmun Papers, (Nov. 16, 2004), http://www.loc.gov/rr/
mss/blackmun. The clerk noted, however, that there was some scholarly commentary
to the contrary. See Preliminary Memorandum to Justice Blackmun, supra, at 3
(citing Milton Handler & Michael D. Blechman, Antitrust and the Consumer Interest:
The Fallacy of Parens Patriae and A Suggested New Approach, 85 YALE L.J. 626
(1976)).
114 Preliminary Memorandum to Justice Blackmun, supra note 113, at 4.
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be more appropriate later, if respondents prevail on remand and
if the [district court] and [court of appeals] then prove unable to
apportion damages so as to avoid this hazard."115
Justice Blackmun's version of the certiorari pool
memorandum includes an October 29, 1976 hand-written note
from one of his own clerks, who asserted "I would Grant."116 In
his view, the case raised "an important unresolved issue in
antitrust law."117  He criticized the rationale of the Seventh
Circuit, arguing that a contrary approach "limiting recovery to
direct purchasers would promote certainty and encourage
enforcement of the antitrust laws by those most likely to know of
violations."' 18  Additionally, he embraced the "symmetry"
position: "It also seems fair to me that offensive and defensive
use of the 'passing-on' argument be treated comparably."' 1 9
While conceding that there was "no clear conflict," he concluded
that he was "sufficiently disturbed" by the Seventh Circuit's
"approach to regard the matter as worthy of this Court's
consideration."1 20
Consistent with his vote to grant the writ, Justice Powell's
hand-written notes on his copy of the same certiorari pool
memorandum suggest that he took an immediate interest in the
case. 121 On the face of the memorandum he noted that "Resp.
claimed 'indirect' injury, + [the Seventh Circuit] sustained
standing to sue-despite lack of privity and risk of double
recovery."1 22  Nevertheless, he also acknowledged that "no
conflict [existed] at the Circuit level, but some" was present at
the district court level. 23 "We could await outcome of trial" he
noted; however, "[p]roof of damages not easy."1 24
But several aspects of the Court of Appeals' decision seemed
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 See Preliminary Memorandum to Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Associate Justice,
United States Supreme Court, Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois (No. 76-404) (Oct. 26, 1976)
(unpublished document, on file as part of the Powell Papers in Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Archives, Washington & Lee University School of Law Library, Series 10.6, Box
43:188).
122 Id. at 1.
123 Id.
124 Id.
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to give Powell real concern. He underscored many of the clerk's
references to Illinois Brick's contentions, and wrote "yes" in the
margin next to one reference to "a substantial risk of double
recovery ' 125 and again next to his own clerk's hand-written
notation that the Seventh Circuit's result "actually contradicts
Hanover Shoe."'126  The clerk concluded, "I lean toward a
grant."'127 So did Justice Powell.
According to Justice Powell's records, in the end Justices
Stevens, Powell, White, and Stewart provided the necessary four
votes to grant the petition. 128 Justices Rehnquist, Marshall, and
Brennan, as well as Chief Justice Burger, voted against the
petition.129 His notes do not indicate which way Justice
Blackmun voted.130
2. The Clerks' Initial and Complementary Impressions on the
Merits' 3'
From the four available files, only Justice Blackmun's and
Justice Powell's include the original merits memoranda prepared
by the Justices' clerks in Illinois Brick. Both memoranda are
comprehensive and illuminating with respect to how the case was
initially received in chambers. On March 19, 1977, one of Justice
Blackmun's clerks submitted his Bench Memo to the Justice on
the Illinois Brick appeal. 132 The clerk divided the first section of
125 Id. at 2.
126 Id. at 5.
127 Id.
128 See Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Associate Justice, Supreme Court, Certiorari
Conference Notes, Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois (No. 76-404) (Nov. 5, 1976) (unpublished
document, on file as part of the Powell Papers in Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Archives,
Washington & Lee University School of Law Library, Series 10.6, Box 43: 188).
129 See id.
130 See id. Justice Powell hand-wrote "Join 3" next to Justice Blackmun's name
on the certiorari vote form, which may indicate that he, too, voted in favor of
granting the petition. Id.
131 As appears to have been the case in Sylvania, the work of the Justices' law
clerks was a significant factor contributing to the outcomes of some of the critical
antitrust cases of this time period. See Gavil, Sylvania and the Powell Papers, supra
note 8, at 12 (discussing the role of clerks, especially in presenting economic analysis
to Justice Powell); Kovacic, supra note 8, at 95, 102, 111-13 (discussing the role of
clerks in shaping a justice's vote as revealed by the Marshall Papers).
132 See Bench Memo from Richard Meserve, Justice Blackmun's Clerk, to Harry
A. Blackmun, Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court, Ill. Brick Co. v.
Illinois (No. 76-404) (Mar. 19, 1977) [hereinafter Bench Memo to Justice Blackmun]
(unpublished document, on file as part of the Papers of Harry A. Blackmun in
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Box 252).
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his discussion into four parts, coinciding with what he viewed as
the four main issues in the case: (1) "Evidentiary Display,"-the
difficulty of demonstrating the degree to which overcharges have
been shared by firms or individuals at different levels of a
distribution chain; (2) "Deterrence;" (3) "Compensation;" and (4)
"Double Recovery." 133
a. Evidentiary Display
The clerk opened forthrightly:
It is of course true that the economic models of markets
demonstrate that an increase of price at one level of the
manufacturing process may influence the prices charged to
purchasers in the successive stages .... Thus the economic
model shows that an antitrust violation at one level can impose
harm on both direct and indirect purchasers. 134
Nevertheless, the clerk noted, Hanover Shoe was concerned
about the "complicated evidentiary display that would be
necessary to show how much of the overcharge had been passed
on"135-a factor that could be relevant whether the issue was
defensive pass-on as in Hanover Shoe, or offensive pass-on as in
Illinois Brick.136 He concluded, therefore, that "this prong of the
justification for the result in Hanover Shoe favors the petrs."'137
He noted, however, that there are three responses to the
"complicated evidentiary display" justification. 138 First, citing
Perkins v. Standard Oil Co. of California,139 he noted that price
discrimination cases have traced the effects of favored pricing
through multiple levels of disfavored purchasers.' 40 In Perkins,
the "evidentiary problem was not viewed as insuperable. 14 1
Second, citing the Solicitor General's Brief, Blackmun's clerk
pointed out that "numerous courts" since Hanover Shoe, "have
133 See id. at 1-6.
134 Id. at 1.
135 Id.
136 See id. at 2 ("The problems associated with the 'massive evidence and
complicated theories' are the same whether the passing-on problem is considered as
a defense, or is considered as part of the plaintiffs case." (quoting Hanover Shoe,
Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 493 (1968)) (citations omitted).
137 Id.
138 See id.
139 395 U.S. 642 (1969).
140 See Bench Memo to Justice Blackmun, supra note 132, at 2 (citing Perkins v.
Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 395 U.S. 642 (1969)).
141 See id.
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not shirked from confronting the difficult evidentiary problems
that suits by indirect purchasers present."142  And finally, he
observed that the instant case may not present the kind of
difficult evidentiary problem that the Court sought to avoid in
Hanover Shoe.143
b. Deterrence
The clerk explains that another "prong" of Hanover Shoe was
the Court's belief that permitting defensive pass-on might
undermine the deterrence function of the private right of action.
Permitting defensive pass-on would leave indirect purchasers,
such as consumers, with "such a tiny stake" in initiating an
action that they would have "little incentive" to do so. 144
The clerk concludes that Hanover Shoe's concern for
deterrence "would urge the indirect purchasers be allowed to
pursue their antitrust claims." 145 Citing In re Western Liquid
Asphalt Cases (Alaska v. Standard Oil Co. of California),146 he
pointed out that direct purchasers may be "reluctant to sue" for
several reasons. 147 First, they may well be dependent "on the
violator for supplies."1 48 Second, they may have in fact "earned a
percentage profit on the overcharge. 149 And finally, they might
hesitate to sue "because there might be some interdependence
between the violator and his direct purchasers."'1 50 He reasons
that, because direct purchasers may have little reason to sue,
indirect purchasers must be allowed to sue. If direct purchasers
are not willing to sue and indirect purchasers are not allowed to
sue, private antitrust actions will have little deterrent effect.151
142 See id. (citing Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 20 n.14, Ill.
Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977) (No. 76-404)).
143 See id.
144 See id. at 3.
145 Id.
146 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973).
147 See Bench Memo to Justice Blackmun, supra note 132, at 3 (citing In re W
Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d at 198).
148 See id.
149 See id.
150 See id.
151 See id. He also added the following footnote: "As a general rule, it would
seem that increasing the number of eligible plaintiffs increases the deterrent effect
of the treble damage action on a potential violator." Id. at n.*.
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c. Compensation
The clerk opens this portion of his memorandum with the
assertion that "[o]f course, one purpose of the [Section] 4 suit is to
assure compensation to injured victims of an antitrust
violation."'152 He notes that Hanover Shoe "did not explicitly
mention" compensation, 153 but offers the following interpretation
to support the view that Hanover nevertheless was concerned
about assuring adequate compensation: "[T]he Court's discussion
of the difficult evidentiary problems could be read at least in part
as a recognition that the passing-on defense might be used to
complicate law suits and to defeat bona fide claims."'154 As the
Court recognized that the passing-on defense could be used to
defeat bona fide claims, it must have recognized that defeating
bona fide claims prevented compensation.
Perhaps this view reflected an intuitive recognition on the
clerk's part that if one focuses on the burden of proving damages,
Hanover Shoe is essentially a pro-plaintiff decision. If the Court
had approved a pass-on defense, defendants would have likely
raised it in situations where any possibility-no matter how
small-existed for pass-on. Plaintiffs, who presumably would
continue to bear the burden of proving damages, would have had
to prove not only the overcharge, but the portion of the
overcharge that they incurred. By so raising the burden of proof
for plaintiffs, a contrary result in Hanover Shoe might well have
discouraged some from filing, and hence undermined the goal of
compensation just as it would the goal of deterrence. Another
way to think of this is that the goals of compensation and
deterrence are not in tension; they are in fact aligned. The more
effective the antitrust system is at facilitating compensation, the
more effective it will also be at deterring violations.
In addition, quoting Section 4 of the Clayton Act, the clerk
pointed out what is perhaps the most glaring obstacle to a rule
barring indirect purchasers from suit: the fact that "[t]he statute
makes no mention of a distinction between direct and indirect
purchasers." 155 Indeed, he reiterates, "the indirect purchaser
may on occasion be forced to bear all the harm from the
152 Id. at 3.
153 Id. at 3-4.
154 Id. at 4.
155 Id.
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violation."156 Referring to the then prevalent "target area" test of
antitrust standing, he added "[a]llowing recovery for harm of this
type is in the main stream of antitrust law."157 He noted that
"[t]he case is quite unlike the difficult target-area problems that
arise, for example, when the employees or the landlord of an
injured business attempt to bring suit for an antitrust
violation."'158 The clerk therefore concludes that "[algain this
aspect of the antitrust laws favors the position of the resps."'159
d. Double Recovery
Although Blackmun's clerk initially notes that the threat of
double recovery is an "aspect of the problem [that] favors the
petrs.," he also observes that "[t]here are ways to avoid multiple
recovery," and questions whether the threat is real in this
particular case. 160
The clerk's subsequent discussion of methods of diminishing
the possibility of multiple recovery remains relevant to
contemporary discussions. He first notes that "[o]ne obvious
solution would be to overrule Hanover."'16  Apparently viewing
that as unlikely, he moves on to a "slightly more palatable
response,"-reliance on procedural mechanisms for allocating
recoveries among direct and indirect purchasers. 62 Citing to the
Solicitor General's brief, he mentions interpleader, transfer, and
consolidation as possibilities. 63 Of course, those options would
have remained viable had the Court permitted indirect purchaser
suits to continue in federal courts. Ironically, by instead banning
them, Illinois Brick drove more consumer minded states to
authorize the suits, which in turn magnified the complexity and
multiple recovery fears expressed by the majority. More
fundamentally, the clerk openly questioned the likelihood of
multiple recoveries:
It may also be significant that the petrs do not cite any cases in
which more than a single recovery has occurred. The short
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 5.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id. (citing Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 23-28, Ill. Brick
Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977) (No. 76-404)).
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statute of limitations (4 years) and the extended nature of
antitrust litigation makes it somewhat unlikely that one suit
will be finished before a second timely suit is commenced.
Discovery by the indirect purchaser as to the pricing policies of
those above him on the chain of distribution would serve to alert
those above and cause them to bring suit. Thus consolidation
and allocation will in the normal course seem possible, and
make multiple recovery unlikely. 164
He concludes:
I doubt that Hanover Shoe should be read to foreclose the
possibility of allocation. Part of the rationale in the case was
that the violator would retain some of 'the fruits of [his]
illegality.' Obviously, although this rationale bars the reduction
of a single full recovery, it does not bar the allocation of that
recovery.165
In the second section of the memorandum, Blackmun's clerk
went on to discuss the historical setting of Hanover Shoe and the
potential uniqueness of Illinois Brick. He noted to Justice
Blackmun that "[tihe overwhelming majority of the cases since
Hanover Shoe have allowed indirect purchasers to sue"' 66 and
that, "with one notable exception," the "commentators... have
favored allowing indirect purchasers to recover damages."' 67 The
exception was an article by Handler and Blechman, 16s which
clearly influenced the majority. 69
In the final portion of this section of his memorandum, the
clerk also considers whether Illinois Brick falls within the "cost-
plus" exception carved out in Hanover Shoe.170 While conceding
164 Id. A handwritten "X" appears in the margin beside the first sentence of this
paragraph, ostensibly to point out the lack of case examples of multiple recoveries,
perhaps an indication that Blackmun also viewed the point as significant. See id.
165 Id. at 5-6 (quoting Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S.
481, 496 (1968)) (citation omitted) (alterations in original).
166 Id. at 6. Among those decisions was Armco Steel Corp. v. North Dakota, 376
F.2d 206 (8th Cir. 1967), a case highlighted by the clerk because Blackmun himself
had served on the panel. The clerk argued that "the case bears a strong factual
resemblance to the instant one." See Bench Memo to Justice Blackmun, supra note
132, at 6.
167 Id.
168 See Milton Handler & Michael D. Blechman, Antitrust and the Consumer
Interest: The Fallacy of Parens Patriae and A Suggested New Approach, 85 YALE L.J.
626 (1976).
169 See Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 728 n.7, 740 n.23, 741 n.24 (1977).
The article was also acknowledged by the dissent. See id. at 754 n.10 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
170 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968) ('We recognize that there might be situations-for
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that there was no cost plus contract between the building
contractors and concrete block suppliers, he highlights the
States' argument that the bidding process used was analogous to
cost-plus because it included the full cost of the blocks. 171 He
concludes, therefore, that "[i]f the case falls within the Hanover
Shoe exception, then there is no inconsistency in allowing
indirect purchasers to recover: there would be equality of
treatment for both offensive and defensive use of the passing-on
phenomenon."' 172 In the alternative, the clerk reiterated his view
that the "evidence [the States] will marshal to show how harm
was passed along will not be particularly complicated." 173
Of the four major points discussed, Blackmun's clerk thus
clearly viewed two-compensation and deterrence-as favoring
the respondent states. He conceded that the petitioners had in
theory raised valid points with respect to the remaining issues-
evidentiary problems and the threat of multiple recovery-but
was not persuaded that they would in this case prove to be the
significant impediments petitioners urged. His overarching
conclusion was unequivocal: "I think the bottom line in this case
is quite easy: resps should prevail."1 74 Yet he recognized that
"the precise rationale for [the] decision ... may divide the
Court."1 75 He offered Blackmun several choices: (1) view Illinois
Brick as falling within the Hanover Shoe exception, a result that
would effectively postpone deciding whether the offensive use of
pass-on should generally be permitted; (2) permit "asymmetry,"-
authorize offensive use of pass-on but retain Hanover Shoe's
prohibition of defensive use; or (3) overrule Hanover Shoe, thus
permitting both offensive and defensive pass-on.176
Justice Blackmun's clerk explicitly endorsed the second
option-permitting asymmetry-the option that Justice
Blackmun himself ultimately chose. He argued that asymmetry
would "further the deterrence and compensatory rationales of the
instance, when an overcharged buyer has a pre-existing 'cost-plus' contract, thus
making it easy to prove that he has not been damaged-where the considerations
requiring that the passing-on defense not be permitted in this case would not be
present.").
171 See Bench Memo to Justice Blackmun, supra note 132, at 7.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 8.
175 Id.
176 See id.
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antitrust laws."177  He conceded that the approach "would
undercut to some extent the evidentiary prong of Hanover Shoe,"
but argued that "that prong is not altogether persuasive in any
event in a case like the present." 178 As to the threat of multiple
recoveries, he simply observed that the problem "would remain
and have to be resolved." 179
Powell's clerk similarly organized his merits memorandum
to Justice Powell, suggesting that the presentation of the issues
mirrored the factors considered by the Court in Hanover Shoe.
On some points, however, his analysis contrasts with that of
Blackmun's clerk, and he set forth five separate options for
resolving the case.
e. The Nature of the Evidence
Noting that "[i]t is a rare case in which as a matter of the
laws of economics the amount of a price increase of an input at
one stage of distribution is passed on in full to the next stage in
the chain,"180 Powell's clerk initially appeared to express greater
concern than did Justice Blackmun's clerk about the difficulty of
accurately calculating passed on overcharges. This was an issue
from Hanover Shoe, he asserted, that "is equally applicable to the
[passing-on] offense."181  However, like Blackmun's clerk, he
pointed out that "the lower courts have apparently not had much
trouble with the evidentiary problem," and, referring to the
position taken in the Solicitor General's brief, noted that "a large
number of courts have allowed offensive use of passing on." 18 2
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id. In a brief final paragraph, the clerk highlights to Justice Blackmun that
three amicus briefs have been filed in the case, all in support of the respondent
States. The clerk found the Solicitor General's brief the most useful, however, citing
it several times in his memo and remarking at the end: "I recommend that you direct
more attention to the brief of the SG than the briefs of the other amici." Id. at 9.
180 Bobtail Bench Memo from Gene Comey, Justice Powell's Clerk, to Lewis F.
Powell, Jr., Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court, Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois
(No. 76-404) (Mar. 23, 1977), at 4 [hereinafter Bobtail Bench Memo to Justice Powell]
(unpublished document, on file as part of the Powell Papers in Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Archives, Washington & Lee University School of Law Library, Series 10.6, Box
43:188).
181 Id.
182 Id. at 4-5 (citing Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 20, Ill.
Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977) (No. 76-404)).
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f. The Need for Deterrence
Justice Powell's clerk found it difficult to identify a clear
position dictated by deterrence. He first noted Hanover Shoe's
assumption that deterrence would be best served by
concentrating the right of action in the hands of direct
purchasers and diminished by permitting a pass-on defense,
largely because consumers would likely have too small a stake to
attempt a treble damage class action. 8 3  But he paused,
declaring: "I don't know how to apply that factor to the instant
case."18 4 He wrestled with the issue:
On the one hand, the more potential plaintiffs, the greater the
deterrent function. On the other hand, one can argue that the
deterrence rationale of Hanover Shoe was undermined with the
passage of the Hart-Scott-Rodino bill. Consumers, through
their state attorneys-general, now have an effective way to
express their stake in the action. ''18 5
For the clerk, Hart-Scott-Rodino ("HSR") clearly affected the
remedial mix, but the question was "how so?" He appeared to see
two possibilities: either it undermined deterrence, or it
undermined the deterrence rationale of Hanover Shoe. If
Hanover Shoe was correct in its assumption that the prospect of
having to allocate and share overcharges would undermine the
incentive of various groups to sue, then Congress may have
inadvertently diminished the incentive of direct purchasers to
sue by authorizing parens patriae actions by the States and
hence undermined deterrence. On the other hand, if by
authorizing parens patriae suits Congress enhanced deterrence,
the deterrence rationale of Hanover Shoe may have been
incorrect-the Court may have been wrong in its assumption
that restricting enforcement to direct purchasers would
maximize deterrence. As the clerk earlier pointed out in his
memo, however, there is some legislative history to suggest that
during the consideration of the HSR amendments Congress
appeared to assume that indirect purchasers could sue on their
183 See id. at 5.
184 Id.
185 Id. As is discussed at greater length below, the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1976, which became law on September 30, 1976, authorized
State attorneys general to sue as parens patriae on behalf of their citizens for
antitrust violations. See infra notes 216-19 and accompanying text.
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own.186 Hence, the likeliest reading of its intentions was that the
rationale of Hanover Shoe would not apply to offensive pass-on
and would not undermine deterrence. Quite the opposite,
Congress appeared to be endorsing the clerk's first assumption:
the broader are private rights of action, the greater is deterrence.
g. Compensation for Injury
Powell's clerk's comments on compensation are in accord
with those of Justice Blackmun's clerk and are straightforward:
the compensation function of the federal antitrust laws "would
suggest allowing offensive passing on to assure compensation to
those who are injured further down the chain of distribution."' 18 7
h. Double or Multiple Recovery
Like Blackmun's clerk, Powell's clerk saw multiple recovery
as a genuine threat if offensive pass-on was permitted, but he
wondered whether "multiple recovery" was a real or just a
hypothetical threat. 88  On the other hand, he questioned
whether the fact that "no one has yet pointed us to an instance of
multiple recovery ... may well be because these cases are often
settled, and for all we know settlements (when added up) exceed
the actual monetary violation trebled."18 9  He also was more
skeptical than was Blackmun's clerk of the Solicitor General's
view that there were procedural avenues available for managing
related cases so as to diminish the threat.190
In the end, Powell's clerk reached much the same conclusion
as did Blackmun's-the Court should permit offensive pass-on
and somehow address fears of multiple recovery if they in fact
surface. 191 But he saw more options for the Court-five in all. 192
Like Blackmun's clerk, he considered the facts of Illinois Brick
sufficiently analogous to cost-plus contracts to permit the Court
to hold that Illinois Brick fell within the exception to Hanover
Shoe.' 93 One advantage to that approach was that the Court
186 See Bobtail Bench Memo to Justice Powell, supra note 180, at 2.
187 Id. at 5.
188 See id. at 6.
189 Id.
190 See id.; see also Bench Memo to Justice Blackmun, supra note 132, at 5.
191 See Bobtail Bench Memo to Justice Powell, supra note 180, at 9; see also
Bench Memo to Justice Blackmun, supra note 132, at 8.
192 See Bobtail Bench Memo to Justice Powell, supra note 180, at 6-8.
193 See id. at 6; see also Bench Memo to Justice Blackmun, supra note 132, at 8.
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could avoid definitively ruling on the permissibility of offensive
pass-on. 194 The clerk, however, rejected the approach: "To me
this is not an acceptable option. We did not take the case to
apply an exception mentioned in Hanover, and we ought to
decide the general issue once and for all. 195
The clerk's second option-closest to the ultimate view of the
majority-was to establish offensive and defensive symmetry:
"The Court could conclude that there can be no offensive use of
passing on except when there is room for a defensive use of
passing on within the exception noted by Hanover Shoe." 196 In
his view, one virtue of the approach was that "there is no
problem of multiple recovery." 197 But he appeared to equivocate
in considering the ability of the approach to produce adequate
deterrence: "The deterrence function will be served solely by the
direct purchaser, which may or may not be effective."'198
Nevertheless, the clerk advised Justice Powell that "[t]his would
have been my preferred disposition of the case given Hanover
Shoe." 199 "But," he argued, "the recent enactment of the Hart-
Scott-Rodino bill complicates the matter for me."20 0 "To go with
this approach guts the basic thrust of this recent congressional
enactment, and contradicts what Congress obviously thinks to be
the current state of antitrust law. I consider this option
unacceptable ."201
Also like Blackmun's clerk, Powell's clerk considered
overruling Hanover Shoe, his "Option C." Overruling Hanover
Shoe would also maintain symmetry between defensive and
offensive pass-on, but would do so by permitting rather than
barring both. Interestingly, the clerk again saw the recently
passed HSR Act as significant to the issue: "To overrule Hanover
(a 9 year old 7-1 decision), we could simply say that the concern
194 See Bobtail Bench Memo to Justice Powell, supra note 180, at 6.
Although these are not cost plus contracts, the bricks are discrete elements
and there is no severe evidentiary problem. This would enable the Court to
avoid the passing on issue. . . . As to the permissibility of offensive passing
on in the normal Hanover case, we can wait for another day.
Id.
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 Id. at 7.
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 Id.
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expressed in that case about deterrence has now been eliminated
by the new federal statute-consumers will sue through the state
attorneys-general." 20 2 He went on to describe what he viewed as
the likely effects of overruling Hanover Shoe:
It saves the basic thrust of the new statute. It to some extent
eliminates multiple recoveries. I say to some extent because
calculations in various suits may add up to more than the
monetary value of the violation trebled; this is so because the
calculations on damages are not going to be all that precise.
The deterrent function is served by all subsequent purchasers,
and effectively so under the parens patriae bill. But there is
what may be an incredibly complex evidentiary issue in all
these cases-exactly how much was passed on.203
"Option D," the approach ultimately endorsed by Powell's
clerk, was to embrace asymmetry-to retain Hanover Shoe's
prohibition of defensive pass-on, but permit offensive pass-on.
20 4
"This option," he wrote, "maintains the thrust of the new federal
statute" and "allows the deterrence function to be served by all
purchasers in the chain. '20 5 Powell's clerk was nevertheless
concerned about the prospect of multiple recoveries: "If under
this option the Court does not limit damages to the amount
actually suffered by each plaintiff, there is an incredible risk of
multiple recoveries. 20 6
The clerk's final option, "Option E," was what he described
as a "modified Hanover approach, along the lines suggested by
the state of Illinois at oral argument."20 7 This option would opt
for a flexible as opposed to a fixed rule for pass-on that would
depend upon the complexity of the evidentiary problem. The
more complex the challenge of allocating damages, the less likely
pass-on would be permitted. The less complex, the more it would
be permitted. The clerk expressed some concern that such a
case-by-case approach could be effective. 208
The clerk concluded his discussion of these five options with
an expression of frustration and a tentative endorsement of
Option D-"asymmetry":
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 See id. at 8.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 See id.
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This is one big mess. My present inclination would be to go
with option D, where the greatest risk is that of multiple
recovery. There are some present-though not entirely
effective-methods to handle that problem. I'd leave the rest of
the problem to be solved by Congress. If it really is costly for
these firms, you can be sure they will let Congress know about
it. 2 0 9
3. Prologue: The Court and the Congress
The Seventh Circuit delivered its opinion in Illinois Brick on
June 22, 1976.210 By that time, Congress was already
considering amendments to the federal antitrust laws that would
expand the rights of states, acting as parens patriae, to bring suit
under the federal antitrust laws on behalf of their citizens. The
petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on September 17, 1976-
shortly before the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act
of 1976 became law on September 30, 1976. The Act amended
the Clayton Act to specifically authorize States to sue on behalf of
their citizens under the antitrust laws as parens patriae.211
The passage of the Act was not addressed by the parties in
any of the briefs on the merits, but it was discussed by the
United States as Amicus, 212 as well as the forty-seven Amici
States. 213  It also was the subject of a focused exchange of
footnotes between the majority and dissents. 214
That exchange first developed within the Court. In a
memorandum dated March 23, 1977, the same day the case was
209 Id. at 9. Powell responded with a hand-written note expressing his
skepticism with respect to the clerk's last point-that firms will have Congress as an
option: "Getting relief from Congress by [corporations] guilty of anti-trust violations
is unlikely!" Id.
210 See Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 536 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd sub
nom., Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
211 The relevant provision was incorporated into the Clayton Act as Section 4(c)
and includes a proviso excluding from the amount recoverable "any amount of
monetary relief.., which duplicates amounts which have been awarded for the
same injury ... " 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a) (2000).
212 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 14-15 & n.12, Ill. Brick
Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977) (No. 76-404).
213 See Brief for the State of Alabama et al. as Amici Curiae at 14-15 & n.6, Ill.
Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977) (No. 76-404).
214 Compare Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 733 n.14, 747 n.31 with Ill.
Brick, 431 U.S. at 765 n.24 (Brennan J., dissenting) and Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 766
(Blackmun J., dissenting) (providing differing views on whether under Section 4 of
the Clayton Act, Congress eliminated obstacles to compensating indirect purchasers
bringing suit under Section 4).
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argued before the Court, one of Justice Powell's clerks submitted
his Bench Memo to Justice Powell.215 In a preliminary section he
discussed the significance of two "important background items"-
Hanover Shoe and the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act, especially title III of the Act, which
authorized parens patriae suits by the States. 216 Quoting the
House Report, Powell's clerk asserted: "The important aspect of
this legislation is that Congress appears to have assumed that
consumers presently have standing to file an anti-trust cause of
action for anti-trust violations occurring at any stage of the
distribution process." 21 7 Indeed, he states, "[t]he whole thrust of
the Act depends on the assumption that consumers, if they had
an economic incentive to sue, would have standing on the anti-
trust cause of action via offensive passing on."218 Referring in
particular to the meaning of footnote 4 of the House Report-
later debated by the majority and dissent-he unequivocally
states: "I can see only one way to read that footnote: the
Congress today approves of offensive passing on."
21 9
The issue for the clerk thus became whether and to what
degree the present intentions of Congress have relevance to the
interpretation of a Congressional Act-in this instance the
Clayton Act of 1914-adopted by a previous Congress. The clerk
forthrightly answers the question: "Technically speaking, the
present views of Congress are not relevant."220 Nevertheless, he
argues that "as a matter of practical adjudication, I would give
considerable weight to the present view of Congress in this very
recent enactment." 221 He concluded: "Realistically, if the Court
comes out against offensive passing on, the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Act is nullified to a large extent. That would make me hesitate
to decide the case in that fashion."222
The same day Powell's clerk transmitted his Bench Memo to
Justice Powell, one of Justice Blackmun's clerks sent Justice
Blackmun a one-page memorandum discussing the possible
significance of the Act. A copy of the House Report was
215 See Bobtail Bench Memo to Justice Powell, supra note 180, at 1.
216 See id. at 1-3
217 Id. at 2 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-499 (1975)).
218 Id.
219 Id. at 3.
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 Id.
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attached. 223  The memorandum had been prompted by a
communication from Justice Powell's clerk, who had brought the
passage of the HSR Act to the attention of Blackmun's clerk. 224
In his brief memorandum, Blackmun's clerk stated that "[t]he
Act bears on the case in two ways."225 The memorandum goes on
to state:
First, if Illinois Brick is decided so as to foreclose recovery by
those other than the direct purchaser from an antitrust violator,
then the purpose of the Act will be largely undercut. I suspect
that consumers seldom deal directly with those in a market
position to effect an antitrust violation.
Second, the House Report... clearly indicates that Congress
intended for consumers to be able to recover "regardless of the
level in the chain of distribution at which the violation occurs."
The Report discusses Hanover Shoe and indicates Congress'
understanding that it applies only to defensive use of the
passing-on phenomenon. Indeed, the report indicates that the
Act creates no new substantive liability. Congress felt there
was a need for parens patriae actions by state attorney generals
because "[w]here . . . wholesalers and retailers have passed on
all or most of the cost of a violation to the
consumer... adequate enforcement mechanisms [of the
antitrust laws] do not exist. '226
The memorandum and accompanying legislative history
certainly appears to have had an impact on Justice Blackmun,
223 See Hart-Scott-Rodino Memo from Richard Meserve, Justice Blackmun's
Clerk, to Harry A. Blackmun, Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court, Ill.
Brick Co. v. Illinois (No. 76-404) (Mar. 23, 1977) [hereinafter HSR Memo to Justice
Blackmun] (unpublished document, on file as part of the Papers of Harry A.
Blackmun in Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Box 252). The attached
Report was H.R. Rep. No. 94-499 (1975), containing legislative history of the Hart-
Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383
(1976).
224 The clerk so informed Justice Blackmun: "One of Justice Powell's
clerks.., has informed me that Congress has passed the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976. The purpose of the Act was to authorize state
attorneys general to recover damages on behalf of state residents for antitrust
violations." HSR Memo to Justice Blackmun, supra note 223, at 1.
225 Id.
226 Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-499 (1975)) (citations omitted) (alterations in
original).
Two check marks, possibly made by Justice Blackmun, appear in the left hand
margin of the memorandum. One is next to "the purpose of the Act will be largely
undercut" in the first paragraph and the other next to "Congress intended for
consumers to be able to recover 'regardless of the level in the chain of distribution at
which the violation occurs"' in the second. Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-499 (1975)).
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who joined Justice Brennan's dissent, but also filed his own, in
part on the ground that the Court was ignoring Congress'
contemporary intentions.227
More broadly, the relevance of the HSR Act prompted some
pointed discussion at Conference, and later a sharp battle of
footnotes between the majority and the dissenters, which is itself
further reflected in the Justices' papers.
228
4. Pre-Conference and Oral Argument
Justices Powell and Blackmun both prepared and retained
notes both before and during the oral argument, which was
conducted on March 23, 1977. On a one-page, hand-written
document dated March 20, 1977, Blackmun outlined the issues in
the case and his reactions to them. One of the main points
Blackmun made in his separate dissent was already evident in
these notes. With reference to Hanover Shoe, he wrote "[t]his
case [should have] come first."229 He elaborated on the point in
his dissent:
I think the plaintiffs-respondents in this case, which they now
have lost, are the victims of an unhappy chronology. If Hanover
Shoe... had not preceded this case, and were not "on the
books," I am positive that the Court today would be affirming,
perhaps unanimously, the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
The policy behind the Antitrust Acts and all the signs point in
that direction, and a conclusion in favor of indirect purchasers
who could demonstrate injury would almost be compelled.230
Blackmun also appeared concerned about the impact of
antitrust violations on parties further down the line of
227 See Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. at 766 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 tells us all that is needed as
to Congress' present understanding of the [Sherman and Clayton] Acts.").
228 See supra note 214 and accompanying text, and infra notes 234, 261, 270 and
accompanying text.
229 Harry A. Blackmun, Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court, Hand-
Written Pre-Argument Notes, Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois (No. 76-404) (Mar. 20, 1977)
[hereinafter Blackmun Pre-Argument Notes] (unpublished document, on file as part
of the Papers of Harry A. Blackmun in Library of Congress, Manuscript Division,
Box 252).
230 Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 765 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). An earlier hand-
written but undated draft of this paragraph appears on a single page of his notes.
See Harry A. Blackmun, Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court, Hand
Written Draft Notes of Dissenting Opinion, Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois (No. 76-404)
(unpublished document, on file as part of the Papers of Harry A. Blackmun in
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Box 252).
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distribution than the direct purchaser. "If he [the indirect
purchaser] is ultimate, as here, he has [the] real injury."231 In
addition, he expressed skepticism about the alleged threat of
multiple recovery, writing: "Multiple recovery sounds good,
but... No case."232 He also appeared to question whether the
threat of multiple recoveries was in fact substantial, given the
allocation of damages among the injured and the "spoils" received
by the offender. 233  His notes conclude: "Clearly I favor [the]
ultimately injured .... Hart-Rodino confirms. '234
Blackmun took few notes during the oral argument. There
are less than a half-page of hand-written notes, most of which
were recorded in connection with the presentation by Donald
Baker, the then Assistant Attorney General in charge of the
Antitrust Division.235 He expressed some disagreement with the
position taken by the respondent States, seeming to suggest that
unless only one level of plaintiff is in court, it would be
inappropriate not to "cut back on recovery from [the]
wrongdoer."236  "The issue," he wrote "is one of prox[imate]
cause."
2 3 7
Justice Powell's hand-written notes from oral argument also
survive.238 The first page briefly outlines the positions of the
parties, starting with "Merits not before us. Only Q is 'standing'
to sue."239 At the end of the page he observes "Danger of double
recovery" and "SG [Solicitor General] supports standing."240
These notes appear to have been made just prior to the
231 Blackmun Pre-Argument Notes, supra note 229 (emphasis in original).
232 Id.
233 See id.
234 Id.
235 Blackmun had the habit of briefly noting some physical characteristics of the
lawyers arguing before him, perhaps as a memory device. Of the head of the
Antitrust Division he scribbled: "slender[,] glasses[,] high voice." See Harry A.
Blackmun, Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court, Oral Argument Notes,
Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois (No. 76-404) (Mar. 23, 1977) (unpublished document, on file
as part of the Papers of Harry A. Blackmun in Library of Congress, Manuscript
Division, Box 252). See also LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN
105 (2005) (describing the practice and offering other examples).
236 Id.
237 Id.
238 Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court, Oral
Argument Notes, Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois (No. 76-404) (March 23, 1977) (unpublished
document, on file with the Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Archives, Washington & Lee
University School of Law Library, Series 10.6, Box 43:188).
239 Id. at 1.
240 Id.
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commencement of the argument, which is more specifically noted
on the second and third pages, and reveal little beyond Powell's
perceptions of the arguments of the parties.
Although Powell took few notes in connection with the
petitioners' presentation, 241 he devoted most of the second two
pages of his pre-conference notes to the arguments of the
respondents, including a half-page on the arguments of the
Solicitor General. Although he noted Illinois' argument that
"Construction industry is close to 'cost-plus' situation," as well as
its argument that in such an industry there "can't be multiple
recovery in this case," Powell also wrote "why?" in parenthesis,
perhaps indicating that in his view the argument that multiple
recovery was so obviously not a concern under the facts of the
case had not been adequately supported. 242 Of the respondents'
arguments, he also noted a few lines later that "like building
blocks ... the price increased [sic] is usually passed on & amt. is
ascertainable" and "[a]rgues no problems of proof."243 He also
noted on the following page that the respondents had conceded
that "there should be no double recovery. Cases should turn [on]
ability of a [plaintiff] to prove that it was damaged."244 In a final
half page, Powell summarized his perceptions of the Solicitor
General's arguments, noting the "[e]mphasis on policy
considerations," the "analogy to tort law," and his belief that
"Hanover does not hold that first purchaser [sic] always recover
full overcharge. '245
Perhaps more revealing are Justice Powell's March 24 post-
argument, pre-conference notes, which were also handwritten
and contained on a single page.246 His frustration seems evident
from the first line-one set apart from the rest-which reads:
"[N]o satisfactory general rule."247  After summarizing both
Hanover Shoe, and the position of Illinois Brick Co., in two
241 See id. at 2. In addition to a sentence noting the procedural posture of the
case, Powell wrote only "Nothing helpful beyond briefs." See id.
242 See id.
243 Id.
244 Id. at 3.
245 Id.
246 See Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Associate Justice, United States Supreme
Court, Handwritten Pre-Conference Notes, Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois (No. 76-404)
(Mar. 24, 1977) (unpublished document, on file with the Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Archives, Washington & Lee University School of Law Library, Series 10.6, Box
43:188).
247 Id.
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subsequent paragraphs, Powell's notes conclude with a final
paragraph, next to which he wrote, "[t]his is my view." 248 The
final paragraph then proceeds:
The problems are those of proof & double recovery. I would
adopt no per se rule-either for 'offensive' or 'defensive' use. As
counsel for State & SG [Solicitor General] recognized, 'concrete
blocks' present a different situation from a component of a
complex product (e.g. chrome in an aircraft engine).249
Whereas Justice Blackmun's views remained constant, Justice
Powell's did not.
5. Justice White Emerges as the Leader of a Shifting Majority
(With Some Help from Justice Stewart)
The Court met at conference on March 25, 1977, two days
after the oral arguments in Illinois Brick, to take its initial
vote. 250 Justice Powell's detailed conference notes reveal just how
close a call the case really was. The result of the initial vote was
6-3 in favor of affirming the Seventh Circuit's conclusion that
indirect purchasers should not be barred, per se, from initiating
suit.2 1 The majority consisted of Chief Justice Burger, and
Justices Brennan, Stewart, Powell, Stevens, and Blackmun. 252
Only Justices White, Rehnquist, and, possibly, Justice Marshall,
initially voted to reverse. 253
Within a week, however, the majority had completely
shifted. Justice Powell's Conference Notes reveal that the Court
convened again on April 1, 1977, following the exchange of a
248 Id.
249 Id.
250 See Powell Merits Conference Notes, supra note 12.
251 See id. (noting all nine Justices' initial votes).
252 See id.
253 See id. (showing a group of question marks next to the initial vote of Justice
Marshall, ostensibly representing his indecision as to which direction he leaned on
the issue). Justice Blackmun's conference notes of March 25 confirm the initial vote
to affirm. See Harry A. Blackmun, Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court,
Merits Conference Notes, Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois (No. 76-404) (Mar. 25, 1977), at 1-2
[hereinafter Blackmun Merits Conference Notes] (unpublished document, on file as
part of the Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress,
Box 252) (indicating a plus-sign next to the names of Justices Burger, Brennan,
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, and a minus-sign next to the names of Justices White,
Marshall, and Rehnquist). As was his custom, he did not separately record his own
views. See GREENHOUSE, supra note 235, at 58-59.
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flurry of memoranda among the Justices. 254 The result was the
emergence of a new majority behind Justice White, who had
argued for reversal during the first conference, and had
persuaded Chief Justice Burger, as well as Justices Stewart,
Powell, and Stevens, to change their votes from affirm to
reverse. 255 Justice Marshall realigned himself with Justices
Brennan and Blackmun in dissent.256
The conference notes of both Justices Powell and Blackmun
strongly suggest that Justice White, who nine years earlier had
also authored the Court's opinion in Hanover Shoe,257 played a
pivotal role in persuading a majority of the Justices to alter their
first votes and support reversal. Justice Powell's conference
notes are detailed and cover both the initial conference,
conducted on March 25, 1977, as well as the second conference,
conducted a week later on April 1, 1977.258 According to Powell's
notes, at the March 25 conference, White made six points that
later supplied the infrastructure of the majority opinion:259
Hanover Shoe did enumerate [a] per se rule. Showing a "pass-
thru" is extremely difficult-except in [a] cost-plus situation. If
[we] don't have [a] per se rule, anti-trust litigation will be even
more complex, protracted & speculative.
"Can't agree with a different rule for 'offense' use from 'defense'
use."
"Leg. history of Hart-Rodino does mention a [Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals] case that support's P.S.'s [Potter Stewart's]
view"260
254 See Powell Merits Conference Notes, supra note 12, at 1 ("We reconsidered
this at Conference on 4/1/77."). He also color coded his notes in blue and red ink so
that the content of the discussions, and the change of votes at both conferences,
would be clear. At the top of the first page he wrote: "New votes in Red." See id.
255 See id. at 1-3 (demonstrating that each of these Justices' second vote on the
merits changed, from affirm, to reverse, thus making a new majority when also
considering Rehnquist's vote to reverse).
256 See id. at 1-2 (indicating that Justice Marshall, after some discussion,
decided to affirm, as had Brennan and Blackmun from the start).
257 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
258 See Powell Merits Conference Notes, supra note 12 (indicating both the initial
vote, taken on March 25, and the second vote, taken on April 1, for all nine Justices,
as well as detailing the rationale of most of the Justices).
259 See id. at 2 (referencing six ideas under Justice White's name as well as in
the margins). Powell signaled that these were points made at the first conference by
recording them in blue ink. As already noted, comments from the second conference
were recorded in red ink. See supra note 254.
260 Id.
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The sixth and final point was written in the margin to the
left of the other five, and stated: "Would not let gov't have it
'both ways."' 261 Powell's notes also indicate several additional
points that White added at the second conference: "Byron cited
Western Paving Co. (consumer case)-lasted 10 yrs. See Milton
Handler's article. Gov't brief is misleading. Congress, in its
recent legislation, did intend to allow consumer suits. Thus,
Congress may well change a Reversal [sic] of this case. Byron
would never allow [passing-on] in a construction case."262
At that point, however, there were but three votes for
reversal- 'hite, Rehnquist, 263 and possibly Marshall. 264  The
Chief Justice appears to have been conflicted. According to
Powell's notes he at first passed, then indicated an inclination to
affirm, then "passed again in view of doubt expressed by P.S.
[Potter Stewart], LFP [Lewis F. Powell] & J.P.S. [John Paul
Stevens]."265 Brennan appears to have been a consistent vote to
affirm, but, interestingly, neither Blackmun nor Powell made
any notes of his views at the conference. 266
Both Justices Blackmun and Powell took more extensive
notes of Justice Stewart's comments. 267 Stewart initially voted to
261 Id. The final reference to not letting the government have it "both ways"
reflects White's rejection of the Solicitor General's argument that Hanover Shoe's
prohibition of defensive pass-on could be reconciled with a rule permitting offensive
pass-on by relying on the rationale that maximum deterrence would result from
precluding defendants from raising a pass-on defense, but permitting injured
indirect purchasers to sue. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra
note 212, at 17-21 ("Allowing recovery by indirect purchasers not only provides
deterrence but also serves the goal of compensating those who suffered loss.").
262 Powell Merits Conference Notes, supra note 12, at 2. See also Blackmun
Merits Conference Notes, supra note 253, at 1 (highlighting the points argued by
Justice White).
263 In his notes of the March 25 conference, Powell wrote next to Justice
Rehnquist's name: "Reverse or could join P.S. & L.F.P." Powell Merits Conference
Notes, supra note 12, at 3. He continued: "Hanover Shoe is flat per se rule. Byron is
right as to holding. Agrees with me [Powell] that per se rule in this area is
unfortunate, but there must be no double standard. Must go both ways." Id.
264 In his notes of the March 25th conference, Powell wrote next to Marshall's
name, simply, "Reverse ???" Id. at 2. Blackmun's notes state: "- ?? Dilemma. Only
1st purchaser can get it-try to get it out of him." Blackmun Merits Conference
Notes, supra note 253, at 2.
265 Powell Merits Conference Notes, supra note 12, at 1.
266 Blackmun marked Brennan's name with a "+," indicating his vote to affirm.
See Blackmun Merits Conference Notes, supra note 253, at 1. Powell wrote only
"Affirm" next to Brennan's name. See Powell Merits Conference Notes, supra note 12,
at 1.
267 See Blackmun Merits Conference Notes, supra note 253, at 1 (noting
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affirm, but appears to have had some reservations. He was
especially concerned about the seemingly per se status of
Hanover Shoe's rule against pass-on, and the impact of the Hart-
Scott-Rodino amendments on the Court's approach to indirect
purchasers. 268 Of Stewart's views, Powell wrote at the first
conference: "[i]f Hanover Shoe is a per se rule, it follows logically
(subject to exceptions) that Petr. is right. This is put in doubt by
[the] Hart-Rodino Act. .... 269 Stewart nevertheless seems to
have been focused on finding a way to accommodate Hart-Scott-
Rodino by softening the per se ban on pass-on.270 Similarly, it
appears that Justice Stevens was initially inclined to affirm, but
only by finding a way to modify Hanover Shoe.271
approximately fourteen lines of comment regarding Justice Stewart's thought
process while noting nothing of Justice Brennan's rationale); Powell Merits
Conference Notes, supra note 12, at 1. Justice Stewart had dissented in Hanover
Shoe, but not with regard to the Court's rejection of the pass-on defense. See
Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 510-13 (1968)
(Stewart, J., dissenting). In fact, it appears from his remarks at the conference on
Illinois Brick that he agreed with the decision in Hanover Shoe regarding defensive
use of pass-on. See Powell Merits Conference Notes, supra note 12, at 1 ("On its facts,
Hanover Shoe was right-but should not be read as per se."). Stewart's Hanover
Shoe dissent took issue with what he viewed as the majority's unnecessarily broad
reading of the judgment and decree in United Shoe, and, consequently, its broad
application of Section 5 of the Clayton Act. See Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 510-13
(Stewart, J., dissenting) ("I think that the [United Shoe] judgment did not have the
broad effect the Court attributes to it today."). Id. at 511. Particularly, he questioned
whether the Court in United Shoe had, in fact, found United Shoe's "lease only"
practice to be specifically unlawful-a presumption on which Hanover Shoe relied in
bringing suit. See id. at 512 ("I can find nothing in Judge Wyzanski's written
opinion... to suggest that he found United's lease-only practice, as such, to be a
violation of the antitrust laws or illegal in any way.").
268 See Powell Merits Conference Notes, supra note 12, at 1.
269 Id.; see also Blackmun Merits Conference Notes, supra note 253, at 1.
270 See Powell Merits Conference Notes, supra note 12, at 1 ("Would read
Hanover Shoe less expansively-i.e. not as a per se rule-& apply same principle
both to defensive and offensive situations."). According to Powell, Stewart further
felt that: "On its facts, Hanover Shoe was right-but should not be read as per se.
Hart-Rodino can be read as viewing Hanover Shoe liberally-not per se rule." Id. In
a final note at the bottom of the next page, Powell also wrote: "Byron says Potter
would over-rule H/Shoe in part. Potter says if one must read H/Shoe as Byron reads
it, then Byron is right. H/Shoe must apply both ways." Id. at 2; see also Blackmun
Merits Conference Notes, supra note 253, at 1 ("Read [Hanover Shoe] less expansively
& as no per se rule.").
271 See Powell Merits Conference Notes, supra note 12, at 3 ("Should not have
double standard. But can cut back on Hanover Shoe."). Stevens appears to have
added, somewhat to the contrary: "Could stick to per se rule in Hanover Shoe case.
Where it is clear that price of ultimate commodity is affected.., should allow
ultimate purchaser to sue .... Measure of damages is important .... "Id. Stevens
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Powell's notes on Blackmun's views both confirm Blackmun's
inclination to affirm from the start, and reveal that he was
persuaded from the beginning that Illinois Brick would have
been an easy case to affirm if it had preceded Hanover Shoe.272
Blackmun also questioned the likelihood of double recovery. 273
Justice Powell also recorded some of his own thoughts at the
conference, 274 noting his initial inclination to affirm, and his
concerns as well: "Affirm? (Subject [sic] to whether it can be
written [without] overruling H/Shoe. Agree with Potter all the
way. If can apply H/Shoe both ways, I'll join Byron."275
Justice Stewart may have sparked the Court's change in
momentum when, on March 29, 1977, he circulated a one-page
memorandum to the conference offering to change his initial vote
to affirm, and throw his support behind the position White
advocated at the first conference. 276 After reiterating his initial
vote, and noting White's contrary position,277 Stewart openly
offered to change his position if four others were willing to do the
same:
If Hanover Shoe is to be read as establishing a per se general
appears, also, to have expressed the view that Hart-Scott-Rodino "applies only to
price fixing," but he "[w]ould not draw distinction bet[ween] monopoly case &
conspiracy case." Id.
272 See id. at 2 ("This case should have come first. If so this would be easy to
affirm. Ultimate purchaser has a real injury. He may have 'right over' against first
purchaser.").
273 See id. ("Double recovery unlikely.").
274 See Powell Merits Conference Notes, supra note 12, at 3. Blackmun did not
take any notes of his own views at the conference. See Blackmun Merits Conference
Notes, supra note 253 (failing to reference even his own name on his note sheet);
GREENHOUSE, supra note 235.
275 Powell Merits Conference Notes, supra note 12, at 3. Blackmun's notes also
suggest that Powell voiced his general dislike of per se rules: "Does not like per se
rules, esp. in this situ[ation]." Blackmun Merits Conference Notes, supra note 253, at
2.
276 See Memorandum from Potter Stewart, Associate Justice, United States
Supreme Court to the Conference of Supreme Court Justices, Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois
(76-404) (Mar. 29, 1977) [hereinafter Justice Stewart Memo to the Conference]
(unpublished memorandum, on file as part of the Harry A. Blackmun Papers,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Box 252).
277 See id.
At our Conference I said that I would be willing to affirm the judgment in
this case if, and only if, the Hanover Shoe case were read as limited to the
type of product there involved. Byron White took the position that so to
limit Hanover Shoe would be in effect to overrule it, which, I might say,
was a not unreasonable position to take.
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rule that a producer cannot assert a "pass on" defense to a price
fixing suit brought against him by his immediate customers,
then I think the judgment in the present case must be reversed.
If there are four others who read Hanover Shoe in that way and
who agree that such a reading requires reversal of the present
case, I am prepared to join them. In my opinion, this would be
the most clear-cut and rational disposition of the case, and
would have the further advantage of eliminating much future
litigation as to what products and services are within, and
which without, the rule of a more flexible Hanover Shoe rule.278
Justice Rehnquist quickly followed with a brief
memorandum of his own in which he confirmed that his "first
preference vote expressed at Conference [sic] ... was in accord
with Byron [White]. '"279 However, he did express a willingness to
consider Stewart's approach, or any other approach, so long as it
addressed his "principal concern"-"that plaintiffs and
defendants [be] treated in an even handed manner on the issue of
damages." 280
In separate memoranda circulated a day later on March 30,
1977, both Blackmun and Brennan reiterated their inclination to
affirm. 281 But on the thirty-first, Powell, while expressing some
reservations, 28 2 offered to "join an opinion for the Court
278 Id. (emphasis added). In the margin next to the sentence italicized here,
Justice Blackmun wrote, "not for me." Id.
279 Memorandum from William H. Rehnquist, Associate Justice, United States
Supreme Court to the Conference of Supreme Court Justices, Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois
(No. 76-404) (Mar. 29, 1977) (unpublished memorandum, on file with the Lewis F.
Powell, Jr. Archives, Washington & Lee University School of Law Library, Series
10.6, Box 43:188).
280 Id. Rehnquist wrote: "I feel I could... subscribe to the general approach
suggested in Potter's memorandum of March 29, although I would want to see it
written out before signing on the dotted line." Id. After voicing his concern about the
"even handed" treatment of plaintiffs and defendants, he concluded: "I would not at
this time rule out some other approach which achieved that end." Id.
281 Memorandum from Harry A. Blackmun, Associate Justice, United States
Supreme Court to Potter Stewart, Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court,
Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois (No. 76-404) (Mar. 30, 1977) (unpublished document, on file
as part of the Papers of Harry A. Blackmun in Library of Congress, Manuscript
Division, Box 252) ("This is in response to your circulation of March 29. I am still
inclined to adhere to my vote to affirm."); Memorandum from William J. Brennan,
Jr., Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court to Potter Stewart, Associate
Justice, United States Supreme Court, Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois (No. 76-404) (Mar. 30,
1977) ("In response to your circulation of March 29, I too am still inclined to adhere
to my vote to affirm.") (unpublished document, on file as part of the William J.
Brennan, Jr. Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Box I: 424).
282 See Justice Powell Memo to the Conference, supra note 14. Powell's four
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reversing.., on the theory that the Hanover Shoe doctrine
applies 'both ways."' 283  He thus embraced the "symmetry"
concept, which appeared to be motivated at least in part by a
perception of even-handedness. 284
Powell's change of view, however, was not motivated solely
by a preference for symmetry. In addition, he remarked that
"[t]here is certainly a good deal to Byron's view that proof of
damages in these cases, absent a per se rule, will be protracted
and speculative-with opportunities for unjust results. The
lawyers frequently will benefit to a greater extent than the
litigants."285 He concluded: "In short, my first vote now is for
reversal in accord with the view expressed by Byron."286  But
recognizing that a majority favoring reversal had yet to take
shape, he also expressed a willingness to compromise: "If a Court
is not available for this view, I would confine Hanover Shoe to its
facts (i.e., to the type of product there involved), and apply as a
general rule the same principles of proof for both offensive and
defensive use."28 7
There were now four votes for reversal-White, Stewart,
Rehnquist, and Powell-one day before the second Conference.
At that point, Justice Brennan circulated a fairly detailed four
page Memorandum to the Conference, by which he likely hoped
to stem the tide of defections and secure an affirmance. 288
paragraphs in his one page memorandum are revealing in a number of ways. In the
opening paragraph, he confirms his "tentative vote" to affirm at the first Conference,
"provided an opinion for the Court could be written that substantially limits
Hanover Shoe to its facts." Id. He continued, expressing his concerns about Hanover
Shoe, but also about the Court's ability to effectively limit it: "I am not enthusiastic
about per se rules, especially where the factual situations are susceptible of such
wide variation. Given Hanover Shoe, I recognize that writing such an opinion-even
if there were a Court supporting it-would not be easy." Id.
283 Id.
284 See id. "I agree with Bill Rehnquist," he wrote, "that a primary objective
should be to assure that plaintiffs and defendants 'are treated in an even-handed
manner on the issue of damages."' Id. (quoting Memorandum from Justice William
H. Rehnquist, Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court to the Conference of
Supreme Court Justices, Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois (No. 76-404) (Mar. 29, 1977)
(unpublished memorandum, on file with the Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Archives,
Washington & Lee University School of Law Library, Series 10.6, Box 43:188)). He
also conveyed that he had "noted Potter's memorandum to the Conference." Id.
285 Id.
286 Id.
287 Id.
288 See Memorandum from William J. Brennan, Jr., Associate Justice, United
States Supreme Court to the Conference of Supreme Court Justices, Ill. Brick Co. v.
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Brennan's memorandum opens by identifying what he viewed as
the purposes of the treble damage remedy under Section 4 of the
Clayton Act, "to compensate the victims of antitrust violations
(the damage feature) and to provide an incentive to the injured
private party to sue the violator (the trebling feature)."28 9  He
also alluded to the role of deterrence:
By not allowing injured indirect purchasers to prove and recover
damages, we would, in many instances, frustrate both
objectives. The courthouse doors would be closed to the real
victims of the illegal conduct in instances where the direct
purchaser was successful in passing on the bulk of its increased
costs, while the direct purchaser, who had suffered little injury,
if any, would be entitled to recover a windfall. In addition, as
the Government points out in its Brief Amicus Curiae at 13,
direct purchasers may have little incentive to sue to the extent
that they are able to continue passing on their increased costs to
others and value their relationship with the violator. 290
Justice Brennan then turned to Hanover Shoe-where he
had voted in the majority-arguing that "[t]hese considerations
were not present in Hanover Shoe."291 This was an attack on the
"symmetry" point, which appeared to be gaining momentum
within the Court. Symmetry was not warranted, he argued,
because the pass-on issue in the two cases was not the same.
292
Illinois (No. 76-404) (Mar. 31, 1977) [hereinafter Justice Brennan Memo to the
Conference] (unpublished document, on file as part of the William J. Brennan, Jr.
Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Box I: 424) ("After reading the
memoranda circulated regarding the case, I have become concerned lest we adopt
what I consider to be an unrealistic approach to the question of 'passing on' antitrust
damages. Hence this memorandum in support of affirmance."). For an online
register of Justice Brennan's Papers, see William J. Brennan Papers (June 2, 2004),
http://www.loc.gov/rr/mss/textlbrennan.html. At the top of the first page of his copy
of Brennan's Memorandum, Justice Blackmun wrote "Agree." Memorandum from
William J. Brennan, Jr. to the Conference of Supreme Court Justices, Justice
Blackmun Copy, Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois (No. 76-404) (Mar. 31, 1977) [hereinafter
Justice Blackmun Copy of Brennan Memo to the Conference] (unpublished document,
on file as part of the Papers of Harry A. Blackmun in Library of Congress,
Manuscript Division, Box 252)
289 Justice Brennan Memo to the Conference, supra note 288, at 1.
290 Id. at 1-2 (citing Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 13, Ill.
Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977) (No. 76-404)).
On his copy of the Memorandum, Justice Blackmun hand wrote "of course" in
the left hand margin beside this paragraph. Justice Blackmun Copy of Brennan
Memo to the Conference, supra note 288, at 1.
291 Justice Brennan Memo to the Conference, supra note 288, at 2.
292 Id. at 2-3.
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Brennan came at the issue in a number of ways. First, he
pointed out that in Hanover Shoe only the direct purchasers
sued, and that hence "[t]he issue was... whether the wrongdoer
could escape liability altogether by claiming that the plaintiff had
passed on all or part of the illegal overcharge." 293 He further
argued that due to the complex leasing arrangement at issue
there, calculating pass-on would have been especially difficult. 294
With the indirect purchasers absent and the pass-on difficult to
ascertain, he argued, "[t]he only persons with a stake sufficient
to justify seeking judicial relief were direct purchasers." 295
Quoting from the Solicitor General's Brief, he argued that '[t]o
allow a passing on defense in that case would have been to allow
the violator of the antitrust laws to retain the spoils of his
misdeeds."' 296 He concluded the point:
This seems to me altogether different from the proposition
advanced by the petitioners in this case that indirect purchasers
are barred from recovering for their injuries even if they can
demonstrate that illegal overcharges were passed on to them,
and I for one never thought that Hanover Shoe addressed this
question.297
Brennan next turned to the "literal language of Section 4"
and the legislative history of the Hart- Scott-Rodino Antitrust
Improvements Act, arguing that both supported indirect
purchaser rights to sue. 298 "To extend Hanover Shoe to prevent
indirect purchasers from recovering for their injuries," he argued,
"thus would substantially undermine the new Act while it is still
warm from the presses." 299  In the final paragraph of his
memorandum, Justice Brennan took aim at the argument that
apportionment would be too complex in all cases and that hence
antitrust cases would become unmanageable if indirect
purchasers were permitted to sue. In response, he argued:
I can perceive no difference between antitrust cases and other
293 Id. at 2.
294 See id.
295 Id.
296 Id. at 2 (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 5-6, I1.
Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977) (No. 76-404)).
297 Id. at 2-3.
298 See id. at 3. Justice Blackmun put a check mark in the left hand margin of
his copy of the Memorandum next to Brennan's quotation of Section 4. See Justice
Blackmun Copy of Brennan Memo to the Conference, supra note 288, at 3.
299 Justice Brennan Memo to the Conference, supra note 288, at 4.
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cases which typically involve ... multiple parties, e.g., products
liability suits. Moreover, I am aware of no other area of the law
in which we have allowed the spectre of potential difficulties of
proof respecting the amount of damages to prevent an
admittedly injured party from having even the opportunity to
prove the extent of its injuries-this in the face of a statute that
purports to give a right to any person injured by a violation of
the antitrust laws to recover damages. Surely the party most
injured should be permitted to recover. 300
Despite Justice Brennan's efforts, and the change of vote by
Justice Marshall, when the tally was done on April 1, the vote
was now 6-3 to reverse. 30 1 His four page memorandum to the
Conference of a day earlier became the framework for his
dissenting opinion. 302 Led by Justice White, who authored the
majority opinion, the Court had reversed itself in a week's
time. 303
6. Evolution of the Opinions
On May 20, 1977, Justice White circulated his first draft of
the majority opinion. 30 4 Not surprisingly, it was received quite
300 Id. (emphasis in original).
301 See supra notes 254-56 and accompanying text.
302 On April 5, 1977, Brennan formally wrote to Blackmun volunteering to
undertake the drafting of the dissent. Memorandum from William J. Brennan, Jr.,
Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court to Harry A. Blackmun, Associate
Justice, United States Supreme Court, Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois (76-404) (Apr. 5,
1977) (unpublished document, on file as part of the Papers of Harry A. Blackmun in
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Box 252) ("I note that you, Thurgood and
I are in dissent .... I'll be happy to undertake that dissent.").
303 See supra notes 254-56 and accompanying text.
304 Ultimately, White produced a total of three drafts before finalizing his
opinion. See Byron R. White, Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court, First
Draft of Opinion of the Court, Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois (76-404) (May 20, 1977)
[hereinafter First Draft of Opinion of the Court] (unpublished document, on file as
part of the Papers of Harry A. Blackmun in Library of Congress, Manuscript
Division, Box 252); Byron R. White, Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court,
Third Draft of Opinion of the Court, Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois (76-404) (June 8, 1977)
[hereinafter Third Draft of Opinion of the Court] (unpublished document, on file as
part of the Papers of Harry A. Blackmun in Library of Congress, Manuscript
Division, Box 252) (the files contain copies of White's first and third draft, as well as
a mark-up version of the first draft). Copies of White's Second Draft Opinion are
available in the files of both Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall. See Byron R.
White, Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court, Second Draft of Opinion of
the Court, Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois (76-404) (June 7, 1977) [hereinafter Second Draft
of Opinion of the Court] (unpublished document, on file with Thurgood Marshall
Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Box 192). For an online register of
the Marshall Papers, see Thurgood Marshall Papers (June 2, 2004),
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differently in the chambers of Justices Blackmun and Powell,
who at that point appear to have been committed to opposing
resolutions of the case. On May 21, one of Blackmun's clerk's
wrote: "Justice White has circulated an opinion that seems very
vulnerable to me."30 5  In contrast, on May 23, Powell wrote to
White: "You have written a most convincing opinion that I am
happy to join."306  That same day, Justice Brennan formally
advised Justice White that in response to his first draft of the
majority opinion he would circulate a dissent.30 7
http://www.loc.gov/rr/mss/text/marshall.html.
305 Memorandum from Richard Meserve, Justice Blackmun's Clerk to Harry A.
Blackmun, Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court, Illinois Brick Co. v.
Illinois (No. 76-404) (May 21, 1977). The clerk added: "You originally voted the other
way and I see no reason for you to reconsider your vote. Should you wish a longer
memo on the difficulties with Justice White's draft, however, I of course will be
happy to prepare one." Id. Going one-step further he volunteered to undertake the
drafting of a dissent: "If you would like me to draft a dissent in this case, I would
welcome the opportunity." See id.
306 Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Associate Justice, United States
Supreme Court to Byron R. White, Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court,
Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois (No. 76-404) (May 23, 1977) (unsigned) (unpublished
document, on file with the Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Archives, Washington & Lee
University School of Law Library, Series 10.6, Box 43:188). The other members of
the majority quickly concurred. See Memorandum from Warren A. Burger, Chief
Justice, United States Supreme Court to Byron R. White, Associate Justice, United
States Supreme Court, Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois (No. 76-404) (June 1, 1977)(unpublished document, on file with the Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Archives, Washington
& Lee University School of Law Library, Series 10.6, Box 43:188) ("I join.");
Memorandum from William H. Rehnquist, Associate Justice, United States Supreme
Court to Byron R. White, Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court, Ill. Brick
Co. v. Illinois (No. 76-404) (May 23, 1977) (unpublished document, on file with the
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Archives, Washington & Lee University School of Law Library,
Series 10.6, Box 43:188) ("Please join me."); Memorandum from Potter Stewart,
Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court to Byron R. White, Associate
Justice, United States Supreme Court, Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois (No. 76-404) (May 24,
1977) (unpublished document, on file with the Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Archives,
Washington & Lee University School of Law Library, Series 10.6, Box 43:188) ("I am
glad to join the opinion you have written for the Court."); Memorandum from John
Paul Stevens, Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court to Byron R. White,
Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court, Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois (No. 76-404)
(May 31, 1977) (unpublished document, on file with the Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Archives, Washington & Lee University School of Law Library, Series 10.6, Box
43:188) ("Please join me.").
307 Memorandum from William J. Brennan, Jr., Associate Justice, United States
Supreme Court, to Justice Byron R. White, Associate Justice, United States
Supreme Court, Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois (No. 76-404) (May 23, 1977) (unpublished
document, on file as part of the William J. Brennan, Jr. Papers, Manuscript
Division, Library of Congress, Box I: 424) ("In due course I shall circulate a dissent
in [this case].").
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Less than a week later, Justice Brennan circulated his initial
draft dissent.308 Although Justice Blackmun joined that dissent,
offering a variety of edits, 30 9 he also expressed his intention to
draft his own separate dissent, 310 which was circulated five days
308 Justice Brennan circulated three drafts of his dissent before it became final.
See William J. Brennan, Jr., Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court, First
Draft of Dissenting Opinion, Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois (No. 76-404) (May 20, 1977)
(unpublished document, on file as part of the William J. Brennan, Jr. Papers,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Box I: 424); William J. Brennan, Jr.,
Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court, Second Draft of Dissenting
Opinion, Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois (No. 76-404) (May 26, 1977) (unpublished document,
on file as part of the William J. Brennan, Jr. Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress, Box I: 424); William J. Brennan, Jr., Associate Justice, United States
Supreme Court, Third Draft of Dissenting Opinion, Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois (No. 76-
404) (June 7, 1977) (unpublished document, on file as part of the William J.
Brennan, Jr. Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Box I: 424).
309 Blackmun appears to have reviewed White's May 20, 1977 draft majority
opinion and Brennan's May 26, 1977 draft dissenting opinion with care. There are a
few minor comments as to substance in each, as well as check marks in the margins
throughout-perhaps indicating points that he viewed as especially important-in
addition to notating typographical errors, citations, and word usage. See Byron R.
White, Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court, First Draft of Opinion of the
Court, Justice Blackmun Copy, Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois (76-404) (May 20, 1977)
(unpublished document, on file as part of the Papers of Harry A. Blackmun in
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Box 252); William J. Brennan, Jr.,
Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court, First Draft of Dissenting Opinion,
Justice Blackmun Copy, Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois (No. 76-404) (May 20, 1977)
[hereinafter Justice Blackmun Copy of Brennan Dissent, First Draft] (unpublished
document, on file as part of the Papers of Harry A. Blackmun in Library of Congress,
Manuscript Division, Box 252). At the top of the first page of Brennan's initial draft
dissent, Blackmun hand wrote "ood -join." Id.
Blackmun had a particular pet peeve concerning the use of the word "viability,"
which Brennan used twice in his first draft dissenting opinion. See GREENHOUSE,
supra note 235, at 238 (describing Justice Blackmun's continuing crusade against
the use of the word "viable."). Blackmun singled them out with "x" marks in the
margins. Justice Blackmun Copy of Brennan Dissent, First Draft, supra. At the
bottom of his May 30 letter to Brennan there is a "note to WJB only" which states:
"Henry Putzel and I have a blood oath to fight 'parameter' and 'viability.' Do you
think the latter word could be replaced with something of greater integrity where it
appears in the 9th line on page 3 and in the 6th line from the bottom on page 6?"
Memorandum from Harry A. Blackmun, Associate Justice, United States Supreme
Court to William J. Brennan, Jr., Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court,
Ill. Brick v. Illinois (No. 76-404) (May 30, 1977) [hereinafter Justice Blackmun Memo
to Justice Brennan] (unpublished document, on file as part of the Papers of Harry A.
Blackmun in Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Box 252). Brennan accepted
the suggestion, substituting "effectiveness" in its place. See Ill. Brick Co., v. Illinois,
431 U.S. 720, 750 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("it is essential to the public
interest to preserve the effectiveness of the private treble-damages action")
(emphasis added); see also id. at 753 ("the same policies of insuring the continued
effectiveness of the treble damages action") (emphasis added).
310 Blackmun formally wrote to Brennan on May 30, asking that he be joined in
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later on May 31.311
Between May 31 and June 8 when the final opinions were
released, there were a number of exchanges among the Justices
concerning various aspects of the opinions, which in turn
prompted the preparation and circulation of the second and third
drafts of the majority and dissenting opinions. Some minor edits
to the majority opinion concerned White's treatment of stare
decisis. 312 Some text was deleted in favor of additional footnotes
providing more specific examples of the breath of possible
indirect and direct purchaser actions. 313 Footnote 27 was added
Brennan's dissent, but also expressing his interest in writing separately. Justice
Blackmun Memo to Justice Brennan, supra note 309 ("Please join me in your fine
dissenting opinion. I may write separately a brief sentence or two.").
311 Harry A. Blackmun, Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court, First
Draft of Dissenting Opinion, Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois (No. 76-404) (May 31, 1977)(unpublished document, on file as part of the Papers of Harry A. Blackmun in
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Box 252).
312 Powell asked White to make his language on stare decisis a bit less
"emphatic." See Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Associate Justice, United
States Supreme Court to Byron R. White, Associate Justice, United States Supreme
Court, Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois (No. 76-404) (May 23, 1977) (unpublished document,
on file in Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Archives, Washington & Lee University School of Law
Library, Series 10.6, Box 43:188). Those changes are first evident in a mark-up of a
page of the first draft that Powell retained. See Byron R. White, Associate Justice,
United States Supreme Court, First Draft of Opinion of the Court, Justice Powell
Copy, Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois (76-404) (May 20, 1977), at 13 (with hand written
notes from Justices Powell and White). Where White had first written that
considerations of stare decisis "are to be given particularly strong weight," Powell
suggested "weigh heavily." Id. In the second sentence of the paragraph, White had
written "this strong presumption" and Powell suggested that "strong" be deleted. Id.
Later in that same sentence White had written that the presumption created by
stare decisis "would be a compelling reason for reaffirming" Hanover Shoe's view of
Section 4, Powell suggested simply that it would "support our reaffirmance." Id.
Powell's hand written notation indicating "Byron agreed to make these changes at
my request" appears at the top of the page. At the bottom appears a notation from
White indicating that he has made the changes to "take the edge off' of his first
draft, "at least a little." Id. These changes were incorporated into White's "Second
Draft," which was circulated on June 7. See Second Draft of Opinion of the Court,
supra note 304, at 13-14. The alterations also appear in the final version of the
opening paragraph of Section III of the majority opinion. See Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at
736.
313 These changes are reflected both in an undated mark-up of selected pages of
the first draft opinion that appears in Justice Blackmun's files. See Byron R. White,
Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court, First Draft of Opinion of the Court,
Justice Blackmun Copy, Undated Mark-Up of Selected Pages, Ill. Brick Co. v.
Illinois (76-404) (May 20, 1977) [hereinafter Justice Blackmun Copy of First Draft of
Opinion of the Court, Undated Mark-Up of Selected Pages] (unpublished document,
on file as part of the Papers of Harry A. Blackmun in Library of Congress,
Manuscript Division, Box 252). In addition, the changes are shown in White's
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to respond specifically to Justice Brennan's arguments regarding
the relative difficulty of calculating pass-on in various
contexts. 314  White also inserted an additional sentence
emphasizing the relationship between the uncertainties created
by permitting apportionment of damages and the incentive of
direct purchasers to sue.315
An especially intriguing edit was made to the Court's
discussion of the compensation purposes of Section 4. White's
original language was deleted in favor of alternative wording
that arguably altered the main thrust of the passage by placing
less emphasis on the principal of compensation. The first half of
the original paragraph read as follows:
Section 4 has another purpose in addition to deterring violators
and depriving them of "the fruits of their illegality." The treble-
damage action is also designed to compensate victims of
antitrust violations for their injuries. It may be argued that, in
elevating direct purchasers to a preferred position as private
attorneys general, the Hanover Shoe rule sacrifices this purpose
of compensating victims for their injuries. Of course, Hanover
Shoe does further the goal of compensation to the extent that
the direct purchaser absorbs at least some and often most of the
overcharge. 316
It was replaced by the final language:
It is true that, in elevating direct purchasers to a preferred
position as private attorneys general, the Hanover Shoe rule
denies recovery to those indirect purchasers who may have been
Second Draft opinion, see Second Draft of Opinion of the Court, supra note 304, at 17
nn.23-24, and in the final opinion. Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 740-41 & nn.23-24.
314 See Justice Blackmun Copy of First Draft of Opinion of the Court, Undated
Mark-Up of Selected Pages, supra note 313; Second Draft of Opinion of the Court,
supra note 304, at 19-20 & n.27.
315 The inserted sentence was added to the second draft and reads: "Added to
the uncertainty of how much of an overcharge could be established at trial would be
the uncertainty of how that overcharge would be apportioned among the various
plaintiffs. This additional uncertainty would further reduce the incentive to sue."
See Justice Blackmun Copy of First Draft of Opinion of the Court, Undated Mark-Up
of Selected Pages, supra note 313; Second Draft of Opinion of the Court, supra note
304, at 22; see also Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 745.
316 Justice Blackmun Copy of First Draft of Opinion of the Court, Undated
Mark-Up of Selected Pages, supra note 313, at 22 (quoting Hanover Shoe, Inc. v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968)).
In the margin of his copy of the first draft opinion, Blackmun wrote "precisely"
next to the second sentence of this paragraph-"The treble damage action is also
designed to compensate victims of antitrust violations for injuries." First Draft of
Opinion of the Court, supra note 304, at 22.
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actually injured by antitrust violations. Of course, as MR.
JUSTICE BRENNAN points out in dissent, "from the deterrence
standpoint, it is irrelevant to whom damages are paid, so long
as some one redresses the violation. But [Section] 4 has another
purpose in addition to deterring violators and depriving them of
"the fruits of their illegality," it is also designed to compensate
victims of antitrust violations for their injuries. Hanover Shoe
does further the goal of compensation to the extent that the
direct purchaser absorbs at least some and often most of the
overcharge. In view of the considerations supporting the
Hanover Shoe rule, we are unwilling to carry the compensation
principle to its logical extreme by attempting to allocate
damages among all "those within the defendant's chain of
distribution.. ." especially because we question the extent to
which such an attempt would make individual victims whole for
actual injuries suffered rather than simply depleting the overall
recovery in litigation over pass-on issues.3 17
The revised version arguably de-emphasizes any criticism of
Hanover Shoe on compensation grounds, deleting the sentence
"the Hanover Shoe rule sacrifices this purpose of compensating
victims for their injuries."318  Instead, it seeks to bolster the
compensation credentials of Hanover Shoe by presuming that the
direct purchaser "absorbs at least some and often most of the
overcharge, '" 319  an at best debatable proposition. More
importantly, the new passage implicitly rejects the idea that
maximum deterrence and maximum compensation could be
secured by having asymmetrical rules. Indeed, it appears to
assume that there is but one rule-the "rule" of Hanover Shoe.
The two dissenting opinions prompted a number of edits
specifically directed at the significance of the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Act. The edits related to the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act in the
majority opinion most directly affected two footnotes-footnote
14, a version of which was included in White's initial May 20
draft, and footnote 31, which was later added. The first, second,
and fourth and last paragraphs of footnote 14 of the final
majority opinion are almost identical to the original footnote as
317 Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 746-47 (quoting Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720,
760-61(1977) (Brennan J., dissenting) and Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968)) (citations omitted).
318 See supra note 317 and accompanying text.
319 See supra note 318 and accompanying text.
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proposed in White's first draft. 320  The third paragraph, in
contrast, was inserted in reaction to what White perceived to be
the common thrust of Justice Brennan's and Justice Blackman's
initial dissenting opinions, that the legislative history of the
Hart-Scott-Rodino Act was directly relevant to the Court's
interpretation of Section 4, even though Section 4 and its
predecessor, Section 7 of the Sherman Act, had been adopted by
previous Congresses. 321 The added paragraph was inserted as a
response to that assertion, which in White's view both Brennan
322
and Blackmun 323  appeared to be making. The inserted
paragraph specifically rejected the notion that current
Congressional intentions are relevant to the interpretation of
Congress' intentions in 1890 and 1914 when the predecessors of
Section 4 were adopted.324
320 An interesting edit was made to the final paragraph. In White's original
draft, the first sentence of that paragraph read: "While we do not lightly disagree
with the reading of Hanover Shoe urged by a coordinate branch of government .... "
First Draft of Opinion of the Court, supra note 304, at 11 n.14 (emphasis added). The
revision deleted "coordinate branch of government," substituting "these legislators,"
an obvious effort to denigrate the significance of references in the legislative history
to Hanover Shoe. See Second Draft of Opinion of the Court, supra note 304, at 11
n.14. The change is also indicative of a more limited view of the general value of
legislative history, one that has been more openly espoused in recent years by other
members of the Court. Compare ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997) with Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of
Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845 (1991).
321 See Justice Blackmun Copy of First Draft of Opinion of the Court, Undated
Mark-Up of Selected Pages, supra note 313. These changes were incorporated into
the "2nd Draft" of the opinion, which was circulated on June 7, 1977. See Second
Draft of Opinion of the Court, supra note 304, at 11 n.14.
322 Compare Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 756-58, 764 n.23 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
with Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 733-34 n.14, 747 n.31.
323 On June 6, 1977, Blackmun wrote to White:
Dear Byron:
Many thanks for your advance notice of the changes proposed for your
opinion in this case. I am making one change in my short dissent, namely,
that the third sentence in the third paragraph is changed to read: "The
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 tells us all that is
needed as to Congress' understanding of the Acts."
Memorandum from Harry A. Blackmun, Associate Justice, United States Supreme
Court to Byron R. White, Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court, Ill. Brick
Co. v. Illinois (No. 76-404) (June 6, 1977) (unpublished document, on file as part of
the Papers of Harry A. Blackmun in Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Box
252).
324 The third paragraph of footnote 14 of White's Second Draft began with: "We
thus cannot agree with MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN that the 1976 legislation 'tells us all
that is needed as to Congressional understanding' in enacting [Section] 4 of the
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But there was an important distinction in the grounds being
asserted by Justices Brennan and Blackmun to justify deference
to current Congressional intentions, one that was further
explicated in an exchange between Justices Blackmun and
White. Whereas Brennan argued that present day legislative
intentions were directly relevant to the interpretation of the
enactments of prior Congresses, Blackmun was making a more
subtle, political point.
Blackmun's clerk wrote to Blackmun on June 8, a day before
the final opinion had been set for release, urging him to further
respond to White. "In my view," he wrote, "Justice White
misuses the thrust of your comment which is that Congress'
present understanding of the Acts is clear."325 He continued, "My
inclination might be to let the issue slide, but we could insert
'present' in our text to force White to adapt."326 Blackmun was
not suggesting, as Brennan was, that present day legislative
history literally binds the Court in its interpretation of a prior
Act. Rather, he was arguing that as an institutional matter it
would be unwise for the Court to simply ignore current
Congressional views and invite possible reversal of its decision.
Blackmun promptly drafted an additional letter to White:
This will confirm the message we gave to John Spiegel [White's
clerk] this morning to the effect that I am inserting the word
"present" in the 5th line from the bottom of my short dissent.
This will be just before the word "understanding." This will
affect, I believe, that portion of footnote 14 on page 11 of your
recirculation of June 7.327
Although White responded to Blackmun's edit by dropping
the specific reference to Justice Blackmun at the start of the
inserted paragraph, 328 he largely sidestepped the distinction
Clayton Act in 1914 or the predecessor section of the Sherman Act in 1890." It then
turned to "[tihe cases cited by MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN .. " See Second Draft of
Opinion of the Court, supra note 304, at 11 n.14 (quoting Draft of Justice Blackmun
Dissent, Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois (No. 76-404)).
325 Memorandum from Richard Meserve, Justice Blackmun's Clerk, to Harry A.
Blackmun, Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court, Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois
(No. 76-404) (June 8, 1977) (unpublished document, on file as part of the Papers of
Harry A. Blackmun in Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Box 252).
326 Id.
327 Memorandum from Harry A. Blackmun, Associate Justice, United States
Supreme Court to Byron R. White, Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court,
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois (No. 76-404) (June 8, 1977).
328 See Third Draft of Opinion of the Court, supra note 304, at 11 n.14.
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drawn by Blackmun in two ways. First,' the substitute opening
language lumped together the point being made by Blackmun
with that of Brennan. 329 Second, the footnote closed with the
dismissive statement:
While we do not lightly disagree with the reading of Hanover
Shoe urged by these legislators, we think the construction of
[Section] 4 adopted in that decision cannot be applied for the
exclusive benefit of plaintiffs. Should Congress disagree with
this result, it may, of course, amend the section to change it. But
it has not done so in the recent parens patriae legislation.330
This was precisely the kind of flippant dismissal of Congress that
Blackmun disdained and sought to avoid.
After three draft majority opinions and three draft dissents,
the Court's final opinions were released on June 9, 1977.
IV. THE ILLINOIS BRICK PAPERS IN PERSPECTIVE
A. Sylvania and Illinois Brick: Two Case Studies in the Process
of Antitrust Evolution
In my earlier study of Justice Lewis Powell's papers in
Sylvania,331 I identified eight factors that appeared to have
influenced the outcome of that pivotal case: (1) the make-up of
the Court; (2) the advocacy of a single Justice, in that case
Justice Powell; (3) doubtful doctrine-the shaky foundations of
the Court's decision a decade earlier in Arnold, Schwinn; (4) a
body of academic criticism of Schwinn; (5) a quality amicus brief
that lent the Court some of its most critical intellectual raw
material; (6) the Justice's law clerk, who appeared to have played
a significant role in developing the Justice's and ultimately the
Court's views; (7) the clerk's antitrust law professor, who was
influential in forming the clerk's views; and (8) what I referred to
as the "harmony of the spheres"-the confluence of all of these
factors.332
329 The final language reads: 'We thus cannot agree with the dissenters that the
legislative history of the 1976 Antitrust Improvements Act is dispositive as to the
interpretation of [Section] 4 of the Clayton Act, enacted in 1914, or the predecessor
section of the Sherman Act, enacted in 1890 .... Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 733-34
n.14.
330 Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 733-34 n.14 (emphasis added).
331 See Gavil, Sylvania and the Powell Papers, supra note 8.
332 Id. at 8-12.
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The Illinois Brick papers are drawn from a wider sampling of
the Court, but nevertheless suggest that some particular factors
were significant in moving the Court to reverse in Illinois Brick
and bar indirect purchasers from suing. The make-up of the
Court was clearly a factor, although a complex one. Simply put,
Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick were decided by two vastly
different Courts. 333
As noted above, only four of the Justices who participated in
Hanover Shoe remained on the Court in 1977 when Illinois Brick
was decided, and they split 2-2. Justice White, who had been
appointed to the Court some fifteen years earlier by President
Kennedy, and who had authored the Court's opinion in Hanover
Shoe, wrote the majority decision in Illinois Brick. He was joined
by Justice Stewart, who dissented in Hanover Shoe, but not on
the merits of the indirect purchaser issue. Justices Brennan and
Marshall, who both joined the majority in Hanover Shoe,
dissented. Of the Justices who joined the Court in the
intervening years, only Justice Blackmun ultimately dissented in
Illinois Brick-Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Powell,
Rehnquist, and Stevens all voted to bar indirect purchasers from
suing.
It is difficult to imagine, however, that the case would have
been decided the same way had the Court in 1977 been the same
as it was in 1968. A major factor motivating the Court to
preclude offensive pass-on in Illinois Brick was the idea that
plaintiffs and defendants had to be treated alike. The argument
is prevalent in the papers of the Justices as well as in the
decision itself. A majority of the Court concluded that for reasons
of fairness, and doctrinal consistency, Hanover Shoe would have
to apply "both ways."
But Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick are strange bedfellows
indeed. Hanover Shoe was a product of the same Court that
333 In the decade that transpired from 1967 to 1977, the Supreme Court had
been transformed. Gone were Chief Justice Earl Warren, as well as Justices
Douglas, Black, Harlan, and Fortas. Taking their places on the Court were Chief
Justice Warren Burger, and Justices Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens.
When Illinois Brick was decided, only Justices White, Stewart, Brennan, and
Marshall remained from the Court that decided Hanover Shoe. White drafted the
majority opinion in both, but Brennan and Marshall, who had joined him in Hanover
Shoe, dissented in Illinois Brick and were joined by Justice Blackmun. Stewart, who
had dissented in Hanover Shoe, joined White in Illinois Brick. See supra Part I.B
and accompanying text.
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decided United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,334 and Albrecht
v. Herald Co.,335 two decisions that were products of the Warren
Court's avowed support for expansive antitrust doctrine. 336
Today, they are widely recognized as unduly restrictive and have
since been overruled. In contrast, Illinois Brick was a product of
the Court that decided Brunswick and Sylvania, two decisions
that have stood for a generation as cornerstones of modern
antitrust thinking.
Moreover, philosophically, the two cases are in truth
irreconcilable. Hanover Shoe was a decidedly "pro-plaintiff'
decision, animated by the twin aims of maximizing deterrence
and minimizing the possibility that guilty antitrust defenders
could escape liability and retain the fruits of their unlawful
activity. Illinois Brick was a decidedly "pro-defense" decision,
concerned about the undue threat of treble damage exposure to
businesses and the administration of the treble damage remedy.
Very arguably, Illinois Brick reflected just as profound a shift in
philosophy as did Sylvania, even though it extended, rather than
overruled Hanover Shoe.337 That shift was obscured by the
"symmetry" argument that found favor with the Court, and by
Justice White's common leadership in the two cases. In truth,
they couldn't have been any more asymmetrical, and the result in
Illinois Brick was certainly not compelled by Hanover Shoe, as
the Court maintained.
True symmetry between Illinois Brick and Hanover Shoe
would have required greater deference to the rights of consumers
and greater concern for compensation, retaining indirect
purchaser rights, even if indirect purchasers were subjected to
334 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (supplier's vertical non-price restrictions on bicycle
dealers were per se unlawful), overruled by Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania
Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
335 390 U.S. 145 (1968) (maximum resale price maintenance per se unlawful),
overruled by State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
336 For a contemporaneous critique, see generally Thomas E. Kauper, The
'Warren Court" and the Antitrust Laws: Of Economics, Populism, and Cynicism, 67
MICH. L. REV. 325 (1969). The incompatibility of Hanover Shoe with a bar on indirect
purchasers was also asserted by the Solicitor General. To bar indirect purchasers in
order to achieve symmetry with Hanover Shoe, he argued, "turns Hanover Shoe on
its head by converting the argument that difficulties of proof should not be allowed
to stymie recovery, as in Hanover Shoe, into the argument that difficulties of proof
must stymie recovery, as in the instant case." Brief of the United States as Amicus
Curiae, supra note 212, at 17.
337 Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977).
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strict standards of proof. In truth, the use of pass-on as a
defense, and the use of pass-on by plaintiffs, serve vastly
different purposes from the point of view of both compensation
and deterrence. Permitting offensive pass-on, but precluding
defensive pass-on, would have, in fact, been more consistent than
treating both alike, and that remains arguably true today.
A second factor that quite clearly influenced the outcome in
Illinois Brick was advocacy, perhaps "leadership" from within the
Court. Just as Justice Powell took the lead in Sylvania, it
appears that Justice White did so in Illinois Brick. The papers of
the Justices indicate that he articulated what became the core of
the majority's reasoning very early on, and that it clearly had an
impact on the rest of the Court. Less clear is the degree to which
he, himself, was active in pressing his views outside of the
Conference. Much of the available record evidences activity by
the other Justices in pressing for a second Conference and a
consequent change of position, but none by White. Hence,
Illinois Brick, perhaps, is more an illustration of collaborative
consensus building within the Court than simple advocacy by a
single Justice, as appeared to be the case in Sylvania.
Academic commentary also seems to have had its impact on
the Court. As noted, the clerks surveyed the literature, and
found it generally to favor the retention of indirect purchaser
rights, with one exception: an article by Professor Milton
Handler and Michael Blechman. 338 The article was referenced by
more than one of the clerks, and in the Court's majority and
dissenting opinions.339 Handler, then a Professor emeritus at
Columbia University, was a very significant and well respected
antitrust scholar. He had clerked for the Supreme Court, was
involved in the drafting of the Trenton Potteries decision in
1927,340 and later authored what was the first published
antitrust casebook in 1937,341 a book that survives to today in
subsequent editions. 342 As was true in Sylvania, the relevant
338 See supra notes 113, 168 and accompanying text.
339 See Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 728 n.7, 740 n.23, 741 n.24. The article was also
acknowledged by the dissent. See Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 753-54 n.10 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
340 See Milton Handler, Letter to the Editor: Antitrust Exchange, 66 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1257, 1259 (1991) (stating that he worked on the decision in Trenton Potteries).
341 See id. at 1258 (stating that he worked on a casebook that was published in
1937).
342 MILTON HANDLER ET. AL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRADE REGULATION (4th
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published scholarship of the time was a subject of thoughtful
discussion at the Court. But in contrast to Sylvania, the Court
majority embraced the minority view from the commentary, not
the prevailing one.
Other relevant and influential factors are also evident in the
papers. As in Sylvania, the clerks were deeply engaged in
formulating the views of their respective Justices, 343 and the
amicus brief of the Solicitor General was noted and discussed by
the clerks 344 and the Court.345 And as in Sylvania, all of the
relevant factors together amplified the possibility that the Court
would strike out in a new and more measured direction.
B. Epilogue: ARC America and Kansas v. Utilicorp
One intangible factor that comes across strongly in the
Illinois Brick papers is the Court majority's self confidence in the
policy choices it was making at the time. But as confident as the
Court majority appeared to be in Illinois Brick, there is evidence
that with the passage of time it began to waiver in that certainty.
ARC America can reasonably be read as a significant retreat
from Illinois Brick and a reassertion of some of the principal
themes of Hanover Shoe.346 This is especially true in the Court's
discussion of preemption, particularly the defendant's argument
that state repealers were inconsistent with and would undermine
the policies of Illinois Brick.347 Remarkably, the Court declared
that state Illinois Brick repealers "are consistent with the broad
purposes of the federal antitrust laws: deterring anticompetitive
conduct and ensuring the compensation of victims of that
conduct."348  Pointedly, the Court continued: "The Court of
Appeals concluded, however, that such laws are inconsistent with
ed. 2004).
343 See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
344 See supra note 179 and accompanying text, and infra note 354 and
accompanying text.
345 See Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 730 n.10, 731 n.ll, 733 n.14. In dissent, Justice
Brennan also referenced certain points of the amicus brief. See id. at 762 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
346 One immediate indication of this is that the remaining dissenters from
Illinois Brick, Justices Marshall and Blackmun, joined the majority in ARC America.
See California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 94 (1989).
347 See id. at 101-02.
348 Id. at 102. In support of the proposition, the Court cited Illinois Brick and
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., a decision authored by Justice
Marshall, who had dissented in Illinois Brick.
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and stand as an obstacle to effectuating the congressional
purposes and policies identified in Hanover Shoe and Illinois
Brick. In this respect, the Court of Appeals has misunderstood
both Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick. ' 349  Hanover Shoe and
Illinois Brick, the Court continued, were simply efforts to
interpret Section 4 of the Clayton Act, not sweeping
pronouncements of antitrust remedial policy. Hence the states
were free to define their own policies differently, and that
included making different assumptions about incentives to sue
and the threat of multiple liability. 350
Yet there is an undeniable air of retreat in ARC America.
The discussion of the Court in Illinois Brick was not so nuanced
as to be tied specifically to interpreting Section 4. The
arguments regarding indirect purchaser rights were broadly
conceived and the reasoning and language of the final opinion
unequivocal.
There is also some evidence in the Papers of Justice
Blackmun that is consistent with an awareness of retreat. As
noted above, the Court's opinion in ARC America was
unanimous, save for two recused Justices. Justices Scalia and
Kennedy, who joined the majority, appear to have expressed
some concerns about the impact of the Court's opinion on Illinois
Brick. In his conference notes from ARC America, Justice
Blackmun recorded that Justice Scalia was "n[ot] happy" and
wondered whether the Court would "let indirect purchasers...
recover if Ill. Brick had gone t[he] other way."351  Justice
Kennedy appears to have been more direct: "This makes Ill. Br.
349 ARC Am., 490 U.S. at 102 (footnote omitted). The footnote to this passage
decidedly retreated from any narrow reading of Illinois Brick's exceptions:
In one respect, the Court of Appeals was overly narrow in its description
of the congressional purposes identified in Illinois Brick. In Illinois Brick,
the Court was concerned not merely that direct purchasers have sufficient
incentive to bring suit under the antitrust laws, as the Court of Appeals
asserted, but rather that at least some party have sufficient incentive to
bring suit. Indeed, we implicitly recognized as much in noting that indirect
purchasers might be allowed to bring suit in cases in which it would be easy
to prove the extent to which the overcharge was passed on to them.
Id. at 102 n.6 (emphasis added).
350 See id. at 102-05.
351 Harry A. Blackmun, Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court,
Conference Notes, California v. ARC Am. Corp. (No. 87-1862) (Mar. 1, 1989)
(unpublished document, available in The Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Manuscript
Division, Library of Congress, Box 526).
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a nullity."352
Justice Blackmun's clerk also expressed the concern that
permitting state indirect purchaser claims would undermine
Illinois Brick, but concluded, as ultimately did the Court, that
the conflict did not warrant preemption. 353 Noting the three
objectives of federal antitrust law as set forth in Hanover Shoe
and Illinois Brick: "(1) avoiding unnecessarily complicated
litigation; (2) providing incentives to direct purchasers to bring
private damage actions; and (3) avoiding multiple liability for
defendants," the clerk observed:
State indirect purchaser statutes interfere with these objectives,
either by curtailing a direct purchaser's right to sue for the full
overcharge (thereby interfering with objective (2)), or by
permitting indirect purchasers to bring damage claims in
addition to those brought by direct purchasers (thereby
interfering with objectives (1) and (3)).354
The clerk rejected the approach outlined by the appellant-states,
however, which more directly attacked the foundations of Illinois
Brick:
I do not think it fair to say, as [appellants] argue, that those
interests were purely creatures of this Court's imagination, not
at all tied to this Court's reading of Congressional intent. So to
say is, to my mind, tantamount to saying Illinois Brick was
wrongly decided, which is not a safe basis on which to rest here.
But the preference for simplicity was no more in Illinois Brick
than a thumb on the scale, tipping the Court towards one of two
plausible readings of the federal statute. I do not think there is
352 Id.
353 Expressly agreeing with the position taken by the Solicitor General, she
concluded that "[a]lthough I think there is some conflict between state policy and
federal policy as set forth in Illinois Brick, I don't think that the conflict rises to the
level required for implication of an intent to preempt state antitrust law in this
area." See Memorandum from Deborah C. Malamud, Justice Blackmun's Clerk, to
Harry A. Blackmun, Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court, California v.
ARC Am. Corp. (No. 87-1862) (Feb. 15, 1989), at 15 (unpublished document,
available in The Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress, Box 526). As was true in Illinois Brick, the Solicitor General's brief thus
appears to have had some impact and was discussed at some length by the clerk. See
id. at 6-8. Contrasting the Solicitor General's brief with that of the Appellant-
States, which it supported, the clerk notes that although "[m]uch here is
duplicative ... it is better stated and is not as predicated on the argument that
Illinois Brick was wrong." Id. at 6. Of the brief filed by thirty-five States and the
District of Columbia, she noted only that it "[a]dds nothing." Id. at 8.
354 Id. at 2-3.
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any need to elevate the preferences identified in Illinois Brick to
the status of fundamental elements of federal antitrust policy,
elements which must be protected by a finding that state
statutes which place other interests first are preempted. 355
She went on, however, to discuss in detail that "serious conflicts"
were likely to arise absent preemption. 356
Finally, there are the notes of Justice Blackmun prepared
prior to oral argument, which took place on February 27, 1989.
Blackmun appeared to agree with the analysis set forth by his
clerk, noting that there are "some risks here-multiple liab-
complexity-decreased incentives" and that "[i]ncentives for
direct purchaser may be reduced," but he did not regard federal
treble damages "as setting an absolute ceiling."357 He concluded,
"I [would] say no preemption & let lower [courts] work out &
[allocate] ... [therefore] I generally agree [with the] SG."358
Perhaps more starkly than ARC America, a year later in
Kansas v. Utilicorp,35 9 a significant shift in the Court took place.
In dissent, Justice White led the Illinois Brick dissenters,
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, in an effort to
establish some constraints on the scope of Illinois Brick. In
Illinois Brick, Justice Powell and other members of the Court
355 Id. at 15-16. Justice Blackmun appears to have hand-written a check mark
in the margin next to the sentence "[s]o to say is, to my mind, tantamount to saying
Illinois Brick was wrongly decided, which is not a safe basis on which to rest here."
See id. at 15.
356 Id. at 16-19. One interesting observation concerns the issue of multiple
liability. On that point, the clerk observed that the Appellants are "disingenuous."
She continued:
The argument that there is no reason to fear duplicative recovery if the
direct purchaser's federal recovery 'represents the portion of the overcharge
it actually incurs' misses the boat: under federal law, the direct purchaser
is deemed to 'incur' the entire overcharge. [Appellants'] position is flawed to
the extent that it relies on the notion that there is 'something left' of a
single recovery which can safely be allocated to the indirect purchaser.
Id. at 18 (quoting Brief of Appellant States, California v. ARC America Corp., 490
U.S. 93 (1989) (No. 87-1862), at 33). She reasoned, however, that "the SG is correct
that the federal antitrust laws cannot be read as setting treble damages as the
absolute ceiling on damages for conduct which violates the federal antitrust laws,
where the additional recovery arises out of violation of the antitrust laws of another
sovereign." Id. at 17-18.
357 Harry A. Blackmun, Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court, Pre-
Argument Handwritten Notes, California v. ARC Am. Corp. (No. 87-1862) (Feb. 19,
1989) (unpublished document, available in The Harry A. Blackmun Papers,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Box 526).
358 Id.
359 497 U.S. 199 (1990).
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had expressed particular reservations about the risks of
embracing any per se rule against indirect purchasers. 360 Like
all per se rules, it posed the risk of over-inclusion and, in this
instance, under-compensation and under-deterrence. Justice
White gave public voice to that concern in Utilicorp., noting
Section 4's "expansive remedial purpose" and openly conceding a
point pressed to no avail by the Illinois Brick dissenters-that its
language "does not distinguish between classes of
customers. ... "361 He went on to describe Illinois Brick as an
"exception" that should not be "extend[ed]" in cases where it
could undermine the "twin antitrust goals of ensuring
recompense for injured parties and encouraging the diligent
prosecution of antitrust claims." 362  These are revealing
arguments coming from the author of the majority opinions in
Hanover Shoe, Illinois Brick, and ARC America.
CONCLUSION
The papers of the Justices in Illinois Brick are illuminating
in a number of ways. First and foremost, they reveal the internal
process that led to the decision in Illinois Brick, itself, a case that
has spawned nearly three decades of debate over the rights of
indirect purchasers. We can observe the Justices and clerks at
work, undertaking to sort through the arguments of the parties,
as well as the influence of outside commentators and amici. Also
evident is the critical importance of the Justices' interest in the
issues posed by a given case and possibly their inclinations
towards leadership. As was true of Justice Powell's role in
Sylvania,363 Justice White, and to some degree Justice Stewart,
played a pivotal role in framing up the issues and crafting the
eventual majority opinion in Illinois Brick.
Perhaps the most significant revelation, however-and
potentially the most worthy of continued attention and debate-
is the commanding role played by the economic intuitions of the
Justices and their seeming discretion to indulge those intuitions.
At the time Illinois Brick was decided, American antitrust law
was just beginning a period of accelerated evolution at the hands
of the Court. Owing in large part to the common law malleability
360 See supra notes 247-49 and accompanying text.
361 497 U.S. at 219-20 (White, J., dissenting).
362 Id. at 226.
363 See Gavil, Sylvania and the Powell Papers, supra note 8.
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of the Sherman Act,364 the Court as an institution exercised
extraordinary discretion in re-defining the content of antitrust
law. What then were the sources of economic ideas that were
flowing to the Court? What approach did the Justices take to
assimilating those ideas and translating them into antitrust law?
And perhaps most importantly-what institutional checks, if
any, exist to temper the Justices' choice of economic assumptions
and models?
In Sylvania, Justice Powell drew upon what appeared to be a
groundswell of commentary and experience critical of the Court's
decision a decade earlier in Arnold, Schwinn.365 He also turned
to a clerk who was well versed in that commentary, owing at
least in part to his own education at the feet of one of its
masters.366 Yet although the core of that commentary reflected a
particular school of thought, it was also clear that a broader
consensus had formed among the commentators, and the Court's
citations to authority reflected that fact. 367 Few today would still
question the wisdom of Sylvania and the Court's decision to
overrule Arnold, Schwinn.
The same cannot be said of Illinois Brick. The Court
majority embraced a minority view from the commentary and
elected to ignore the speculative nature of some of the petitioners'
seemingly most powerful arguments-that direct purchasers in
fact typically suffered the brunt of overcharge injuries and would
therefore sue, that indirect purchaser rights would lead to per se
unmanageable apportionment issues, and that multiple liability
for defendants was a genuine threat. Moreover, although the
Court articulated the question before it as one of statutory
interpretation, and later insisted on that view in ARC America,
the language of Section 4 was itself unambiguous and all-
encompassing, and no original Clayton Act legislative history
was cited to support the Court's decision to ban indirect
purchaser actions despite that language. 368 The Court was in
364 See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20-21 (1997) ("Congress 'expected
the courts to give shape to the statute's broad mandate by drawing on common-law
tradition."' (quoting National Soc. of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435
U.S. 679, 688 (1978))).
365 See Gavil, Sylvania and the Powell Papers, supra note 8, at 10-11.
366 See id. at 12.
367 See, e.g., Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 54-57 (1977).
368 Although strictly speaking that "common law" tradition was confined to the
Sherman Act, the Court has approached questions under the Clayton Act, especially
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fact embarking upon a sui generis policy debate.
Although Hanover Shoe, Illinois Brick, and ARC America all
have their critics and supporters today, few continue to defend
the system that the three cases produced. Perhaps surprisingly,
there appears to be a growing consensus that the divided federal-
state remedial scheme established by these cases is broken and
needs to be fixed, and that a fix will have to come from
Congress. 369 To acknowledge that the collective consequences of
the Court's work in this area may require legislative correction is
to recognize that the Court can make mistakes in endorsing
economic ideas, that it can take a very long time to undo those
mistakes, and that institutionally, only the Congress is in a
position to do so if the Court declines to reverse course.
If one accepts the premise that Hanover Shoe, Illinois Brick
and ARC America represent failed policy and hence failed
economic analysis by the Court, the question remains: why was
the Court misled? Based on the currently available papers of the
Justices there is no clear answer to this very important question.
In the end, there was no specific support for Justice White's
position-it just seemed well-reasoned to the members of the
majority. As Justice Blackmun pointed out, there were no
reported cases of multiple liability and the lower courts that had
rejected the notion that Hanover Shoe would equally bar
offensive and defensive pass-on did not appear to be having a
major problem with apportionment.3 7 0 These facts were raised by
the parties and the government, but seemingly dismissed by the
majority.
In the end, it appears that the majority-especially Justice
White-relied on its own intuitions more so than any specific
source. Was the Court simply indifferent to the lack of factual
bases for its critical assumptions? Did it really believe, as
Justice White suggested, that if Congress didn't approve of its
economic reasoning it could simply alter course? Here the
current absence of access to Justice White's papers may be
its remedial provision, Section 4, with a similar perception of its discretion. Illinois
Brick is a case in point, and this remains an additional ground to challenge its
conclusion that Section 4 did not reach indirect purchasers.
369 This was evident during the recent hearings conducted on Illinois Brick by
the Antitrust Modernization Commission. See Antitrust Modernization Comm'n,
Commission Documents, http://www.amc.gov/commissionhearings/indirect_
purchaser.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2005).
370 See supra notes 231-34 and accompanying text.
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especially important. Given the pivotal role he seems to have
played in the case, it would be informative to know how he
became so convinced of the correctness of his assumptions.
If indeed the Court relied primarily on its intuitions-and
those intuitions led it astray-then perhaps the Papers
illuminate an institutional flaw in the thought processes of the
Court. Perhaps in areas such as government regulation of
business, the Court should demand more of itself, and the parties
before it, than mere reliance on intuitions. Perhaps parties, too,
should be more aggressive in highlighting the presence or
absence of factual bases for key economic assumptions, although
that may not overcome the Court's seeming inclination to endorse
economic reasoning on its own. 371 In that, the Illinois Brick
papers may also present an important lesson for the Court itself:
when venturing into assumptions informed by little more than
intuitions-about economics and the conduct of litigation-
perhaps the most important judicial intuitions should be
humility and self-restraint.
371 For a recent and extreme example, see Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Trinko, 540
U.S. 398 (2004). For a critique of the economic reasoning in Verizon, see Gavil,
supra note 26.
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